The first lessons of the operation in Libya according to Admiral Guillaud
(BRUSSELS2) The Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces, Admiral Edouard Guillaud, has begun to publicly draw lessons from the operation in Libya. It was before the National Assembly the lessons of the operation in Libya, at the beginning of October.
The great lesson » of the intervention in Libya is that " no army, air, land or sea, alone has the capacity to resolve a crisis. It is their complementarity and the combination of their resources that gives effectiveness to military action. It is also their level of preparation, training and responsiveness that allows them to act quickly and get straight to the point. We have thus witnessed the return of combined operations, in the sense in which it has been understood since the Second World War, requiring a clockwork mechanism that very few countries are able to achieve. »
Another “remark” according to Admiral Guillaud: “ the responsiveness of our decision-making chain, not just military, was an asset in crisis management. In discussing with my Italian, British, German or American counterparts, I note that we have reached a form of balance that few democracies have found. This gives the Chief of the Armed Forces a great capacity for action while strengthening parliamentary control of our external commitments.. In other words, for the Chief of Staff, there is no need to change a winning system and increase parliamentary control over military operations.
Finally, " always remember that an ability is never limited to equipment. It is backed by a doctrine, an organization, and support. It only exists because soldiers are recruited, trained and trained to serve a weapon system. "And it's up to the Chief of the Defense Staff" to harmonize the different pillars that structure a capacity ».
The role of helicopters
The involvement of the helicopters of the ALAT (the light aviation of the army), much publicized, was rather limited in terms of number of sorties - around thirty raids - but important in terms of destruction of objectives - 550 objectives destroyed. The French carried out most of the strikes (90%), the remaining 10% being carried out by British Apache helicopters.
On the aviation side, Air Force and Navy aircraft have achieved " approximately 4 sorties, i.e. 500 flight hours, representing 20% of coalition sorties, 000% of offensive missions and 25% of strikes with more than 35 military objectives destroyed ».
Operation cost
The additional costs are estimated - as of September 30 according to the Admiral - " between 330 and 350 million euros, i.e. an estimate of around 430 million if the operation is extended until December 31”. A balance sheet to which certain costs must be added. During the intervention, the army " consumed 1 bombs, 000 missiles, 600 rockets ". Consequently, today, it is necessary rebuild some of our capacities, advance or complete maintenance operations to restore potential to our equipment, make up for a certain number of delays in the qualification of the youngest pilots ". NB: This cost is therefore not included in the invoice indicated by the Admiral
The cost of external operations in 2011, burdened by Afghanistan
In the end, for 2011, all of the additional costs of external operations for France " is thus valued at between 1,2 and 1,3 billion euros in 2011 ". An overflow of approx. "600 million compared to the envelope voted for 2011 (630 million euros). Apart from Libya, it is the cost of increasing the protection of the forces deployed in Afghanistan that explains this increase, which would be even higher if it were not partially offset. by lower spending in Kosovo and for Atalanta ».
In detail, are spent: from 500 to 520 million euros in Afghanistan, 430 million in Libya, 90 million for Chad, a little less than 80 million for Lebanon, 65 million in Côte d'Ivoire, around thirty million for the Atalanta anti-piracy operation. The rest of the operations cost a total of around 50 million euros.
