Between the lines of the German military revolution

(BRUXELLES2) The restructuring underway in Germany, with the end of conscription, is a political upheaval that is doubtless more important than what one might expect.

Reduction in the size of the army, professionalization

We have often focused on the most visible measures announced by the new Defense Minister, Thomas de Maizière, in mid-May: reduction of 35.000 people from the army, reducing it from 220.000 to 185.000 soldiers (including 170.000 professionals and 15.000 volunteers), the civilian workforce decreasing by 20.000 positions (from 75.000 to 55.000 full-time equivalents).

All associated with a reorganization of the chain of command should save 8,3 billion euros within 4 years (2015) and increase the number of soldiers who can be sent abroad from 7.000 to 10.000 . Less has been said about the adoption of new " Guidelines which are the doctrinal line of the Bundeswehr. Obviously nothing revolutionary. These guidelines define the threats and the fundamentals of the German army: the transatlantic attachment, the European defense...

The Bundeswehr, the backbone of security

There are, however, “interesting” nuances, as a German general told me. For the first time, the Bundeswehr is thus mentioned as " backbone in safety and protection. "" Without armed forces, the threat of the use of armed force and its application even under international law remains inconceivable. “is it also specified. And " its area of ​​action not only to the defense of the territory but to the areas of German responsibility ».

The concept of security goes beyond the purely geographical framework ". The responsibility? protection of citizens goes well beyond that? from the borders of Germany. " The armed forces must be able to ensure the best and under responsibility? national rescue and evacuation of German nationals exposed? direct dangers a? abroad. »

The risk: weak states rather than strong states

The definition of risk is also clearly stated. Basically, according to our observer, the risk does not come from states that are too strong but from states that are too weak... This concept is explained in the "Guidelines". " A direct threat from German territory by conventional military means remains unlikely. (...) The risks and threats we face today come in particular from failing or failed states, international terrorist networks, terrorist and dictatorial regimes, the upheavals linked to the break-up of the latter...”

Networks, a risk in themselves

To the already classic risks of international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction... are added less classic risks, such as electronic networks. These communication networks and the importance they have taken in everyday and economic life makes the risk of cyberattack all the more sensitive. But the interconnection of networks and the speed of information transmission " provides extremists with many opportunities for disinformation and facilitates radicalization and destabilization ". “In a very short time, often unevaluated information (can spread) has? across the whole planet”.

The undeniable kin security of prosperity

Freedom? trade routes and security? supply of raw materials are " of vital importance for the future from Germany and Europe. " Any disruption of transport routes and flows of raw materials and goods, due for example to acts of piracy or sabotage of air traffic, presents a danger to our security? and prosper?. ".

NATO and the nuclear weapon all the same

These lines also acknowledge that " according to its new strategic concept, the Atlantic Alliance will remain a nuclear alliance ". " The need to maintain nuclear deterrence remains as long as nuclear weapons remain an instrument capable of being used in military conflict. “is it also specified. This is an important point in a Germany which is denuclearising, on the civilian side, and remains officially opposed to the use of nuclear weapons.

And Europe?

The lines reaffirm a classic European credo and the necessity of the Franco-German couple. " As a political player that wants to be effective, Europe must increase its capacity? of action also in terms of security policy? ; this will allow it to assume responsibilities alone in the face of security challenges? common to inside and a? outside of Europe. (...) A successful technological base in key areas is the precondition for maintaining and – if possible – strengthening a competitive European armaments industry. »

Download the guidelines, B2 docs