The French army: a “Potemkin army”
(BRUXELLES2) Colonel Michel Goya, director of research "New Conflicts" at IRSEM, delivered a sharp criticism of the restructuring undertaken in the French army, with the shimmering style that we know him during workshops of the Citadel in Lille, last Thursday. An army that he deems too tight in a budgetary trap that must be got rid of, by investing more. He sets the bar very high - at 3% of GDP - and just as necessary wants to make the nation and the elites aware of this need for defence.
Exploding costs and a Potemkin army
« We got off to a bad start on defense reform: the restructuring and the exponential cost of industrial programs – where each program costs 4 times more than the previous one – combined with the reduction in budgets can only have a negative effect. The cost of MCO (maintenance in operational condition) is exploding due to the conservation of old equipment and the arrival of high-tech equipment » both of which are very expensive. Results “The (French) army looks more and more like a Potemkin army. If the French army of 1990 faced the army of 2011, it would be that of 1990 who won. There are gaps – partially compensated by the action in coalition and the supply of the Americans. The morale of the armies is at its lowest. Fortunately there is Afghanistan which plays (positively) for morale. »
Spend 3% of GDP on Defense
For the Colonel, we must invest more in defense. It sets the bar even higher than the theoretical bar of 2% set by NATO but rarely reached (and which is likely to be even less so in the future). " Below 3% of GDP, the armed forces are struggling to renew themselves “, he underlines highlighting” dividends of peace”. “If we had maintained the same pace as during the Cold War, that would represent 200 billion euros he says.
Regain the speed and speed of intervention of yesteryear
However, Colonel does not believe in the European way to allow France to regain its military capabilities nor really working in coalition for the "real operations". It is rather necessary to find what made the success of past operations such as in Zaire in the 1970s: speed and timeliness, relying on constitutional decision-making process, thus enabling decision-making autonomy and military capability ».
Convince decision-makers and public opinion
Decision-makers and public opinion must be convinced of this need (to invest in defence). Which is far from obvious because the threat is less direct. " France is a strategic island, it no longer has to fear invasion, its operations take place offshore » but still look like « wars ". It is therefore also necessary to prepare the nation and its elites for a fact: “ There is no military result without losses ».
And to conclude his presentation by campaigning for permanent adaptation. " As Napoleon said, a nation that wants to keep its preeminence must change its military stature every ten years.."
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