Is NATO dragging on strikes in Libya? Explanations

(BRUSSELS2) The question torments our Arab friends. Is NATO dragging on strikes in Libya? I was invited to Al Jazeera (Arabic language) last night, to try to see things more clearly. We had to have a debate with General Abdel Fatah Younès, the former Minister of the Interior of Gaddafi who went to the opposition and today Chief of Staff of the CNT forces. But the technical link could not be made. And so two interviews followed. The NATO spokesperson having slipped away, I had the difficult task of giving both the point of view of the Alliance (everything happens!) and my own feeling as an observer. In other words, a nice balancing act...

A feeling of incomprehension to dissipate

The temptation to see a "plot" is great in Arab opinion, which does not understand NATO's caution over Gaddafi, and sees it as a temptation to preserve power, to strike a kind of balance between pros and the anti-Gaddafi. A feeling reinforced by the impression that Westerners did not have the same caution, the same hesitation, in the past in Iraq, or even today in Afghanistan (it is difficult to say the opposite). The situation is all the more sensitive because several States - Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and today Jordan - are today committed to the Alliance. So there is a lot of impatience and misunderstanding as well. And a need for a more frank and complete explanation.

Nuances of General Younès

Let us specify right away that General Younès (with whom the link could finally be established) then moderated his remarks. While on Tuesday he denounced NATO's "inaction" in the conduct of Operation Unified Protector, he smoothed things over: "I ask NATO to do everything it can. We are sure that the NATO countries have good intentions. But you have to see that there are people here who are suffering. I please act as soon as possible"(*)

“There are people here who are suffering.
I ask (NATO) to act as quickly as possible."
General Younes

Eight elements of explanation

We can identify several elements in this slowdown in action since NATO's takeover of the operation in Libya previously carried out in coalition (Operation Odyssey Dawn). Some purely objectives, others are due to military mechanics... and politics.

First factor: the weather

Totally objective and external, but not to be forgotten all the same

Second factor: the transition of command to a rigid structure

The transition of command - from coordinated national (coalition) command to integrated command - cannot be accomplished in minutes. NATO has just taken command and it needs some time to ensure the smooth transition.

This command structure - the "machinery" of NATO, as Nicolas Sarkozy called it, is certainly heavier than a national command structure. In France, the chain of command between the President of the Republic, his particular Chief of Staff (Benoit Puga, former Chief of Military Intelligence) and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (Admiral Guillaud who is also his particular former chief of staff) is certainly faster and more direct.

The fact that the majority of the commands depend on the Americans - who have however withdrawn from offensive action - and that no command is entrusted to a Frenchman or a Briton and the fact that certain military resources - American and French in particular - remain under national command do not facilitate the task of the operation commander either.

Third factor: political division of the Alliance

The political division between the pros and the anti-interventions within the Alliance does not make things any easier. How to carry out operations when a large minority of the Alliance (Turkey, Germany, and a good part of Central and Eastern Europe) is against these operations. And that, contrary to everything that is said, everything is not really "stalled" between the Allies. Discussions between NATO ambassadors at the NAC continue. It is also necessary to take into account the political developments within the countries on the Libyan question: the USA at the start of the electoral campaign, Italy which is evolving from a reluctance to operations to a stronger commitment, Germany neutral and neutralized with a defence-foreign affairs couple that does not work perfectly...

Fourth factor: the interpretation of resolution 1973

Several notions of Security Council resolution 1973 can lend themselves to different interpretations. Because these are notions, all in all new, in international operations. The debate is not theoretical. Their interpretation depends on the progress of operations.

So it is with the notion of "protection of civilians". Its interpretation is certainly not the same in all the countries of the Alliance and in the Arab countries. Thus recently an Egyptian expert questioned by Al Jazeera explained that a man of the rebellion, coming from the population, with weapons in hand was a "civilian" who had to be protected. This is certainly not the same reading at NATO HQ. The commander of the operation, Charles Bouchard, insisted in the first days on the necessary " total neutrality" between the combatants on the ground. For the French or British, even the Americans, the camp is very clear, it is a question of allowing "to loosen the grip on the cities held by the opposition" as well as the mentioned President Sarkozy, going even further to estimate that “the army should return to the barracks and move away from the cities.” As we can see, there is a singular difference in interpretation.

Ditto on the notion of "occupying forces". Is it the prohibition of any presence on the ground on which NATO persists. Or - even if they do not admit it officially but recognize it half-word - do we admit the presence of elements on the ground , "liaison", "guidance" or even training and training, which are not defensive forces or territorial control. My opinion: The notion of "occupying forces" rather tilts the balance in the second sense.

Finally, what to think of the "arms embargo", does it target Libyan territory or only the power of Gaddafi. The use in the resolution of the terminology " Libyan Socialist Arab Jamahiriya" lends itself to several interpretations: either one considers that it is neither more nor less than the official name of the Member State of the UN (this is the classic legal interpretation of international law), or one considers that it only targets Kadhafi's power (political interpretation). My opinion: the "classic" interpretation of the State seems to me to be the right one.

Fifth factor: the military reality on the ground, a war on the ground rather than a war in the air

Strikes aren't as easy as they were on day one. At that time, the effect of surprise and disorganization of the Libyan forces certainly played a role. Moreover, it was a question of destroying rather large, quite distinct objectives. Meanwhile, the Libyan forces have reorganized. And faithful to their spirit that a civilian death is worth less than a military death (which is the opposite in the Western camp), they skilfully mix civilians and soldiers, hiding behind civilians to progress. They still have surface-to-air strike forces, which are mobile and therefore difficult to detect and neutralize, which does not complicate the task of the air forces (in the strike dimension).

But above all, the Libyan forces operate on the ground with fairly basic means: mortar strikes or mobile Grad missiles, heavy machine guns mounted on light vehicles, snipers on roofs or in dwellings... So many means that can be easily moved and placed near dwellings. Because the goal is not only to gain ground (in the military sense) but also to sow terror in the population to ensure its loyalty.

With this type of tactics, the best aerial device cannot do anything. And NATO fears more than anything, in this very politically sensitive operation, and visible in the media, possible collateral damage that would threaten the operation itself.

Sixth factor: the organization of opposition forces

The forces of the CNT are in full organization. Starting from zero - or almost zero - they must go from an urban defense force - of the National Guard type - capable of holding or reconquering a town to an offensive force, of the armed commando type, capable of taking towns - which are sometimes not quite friendly (Sirte for example). This organization also lacks a good link between these (land) resources and the (air) resources of NATO. Element complicated by the ban enacted to have "occupation" troops on Libyan soil. Misrata's supply is already a good thing. It should probably be supplemented by a transfer of CNT forces by sea.

Seventh factor: the law of war

This intervention certainly cannot overcome, in a few days, a regime which lasted 42 years and which decided to wage a merciless struggle against its opponents. The comparison with Tunisia and Egypt is not possible. Because in these two cases, the army either sided with the opposition, or at least was neutral. In the present case, the army still remains, in part, loyal to the regime. And above all its special security forces, not hesitating to resort to mercenaries (Africans but also Eastern Europeans or the former USSR). The reconquest of a territory such as this, facing a tougher opponent than we thought, will not be done in 2 or 3 days. And not only by military means.

Eighth factor: the opposition scores points on the other fronts

"War is the continuation of politics by other means". This sentence of Clausewitz, often quoted, can easily be used to qualify the politico-military situation in the Libyan crisis. The objective of this offensive by the insurgents as well as by the European Union and most of the NATO countries (including Turkey and Germany) is the same: the fall of the Gaddafi regime. And other fronts are currently open. Political contacts are multiplying - even if nothing concrete leads. Some veterans of the regime continue to leave it And, over the days, the CNT strengthens its credibility.

After France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Italy recognized the CNT as "only legitimate interlocutor". This is a tipping point in a state very close to the Libyan regime and with many economic and political contacts. Within the EU, only Germany - among the large states - remains to maintain a caution in this approach."Germany recognizes the CNT as one of the interlocutors but not the only one" confirmed a European diplomat to me.Position which still remains officially that of the European Union.The spokesperson for Cathy Ashton confirmed on Wednesday.

Economic and financial sanctions are also starting to work - sanctions which could be reinforced in the coming days if the EU adopts sanctions targeting oil and gas resources.

In a power that had three essential means to hold - fidelity and loyalty to the leader, terror and money - the last two are crumbling. And the combined pressure of politics, the military and the economy will eventually bring it down

Read also:

• France half-wordly criticizes NATO's foot on the brake
• Unified protector: Europeans alone on board. First Thoughts
• Gaddafi's mercenaries… recruited from all directions?
• Resolution 1973 on Libya emphasizes the “protection of civilians”.

(*) Thanks to Labib the correspondent of Al Jazeera in Brussels for his explanations and to the translators of Al-Jazeera (I am not, yet, very 'fluent' in Arabic 🙂 ).