A "no fly zone" on Libya, in 3 questions
(BRUXELLES2/ANALYSE) The establishment of a "no-fly zones"is more than an option, it has been under study for several days already. And David Cameron, the English Prime Minister has just confirmed it: "I asked the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff to work with our allies on plans for a military no-fly zone“, he said in the House of Commons (read his statement here). In fact, with the declaration of an arms embargo, the establishment of military control of the Libyan zone is essential (unless you consider that this embargo is just theoretical). But to succeed in establishing a "no fly zone", there are a certain number of steps and conditions to be respected: legal, political, operational.
1° A legal framework
The establishment of a "no-fly zones", which amounts to a measure of force, of interference in the air sovereignty of a State, supposes an authorization of the Security Council of the United Nations. That supposes a new meeting and a new resolution. It is not out of of range. But it requires some negotiation. If the situation becomes "untenable", and that the Gaddafi government does not fall in the coming days, this option should come back on the table quickly. Because two risk scenarios exist: that of a stalemate in the conflict - in the Ivorian way for example or in the Bosnian way - that of a terrorist drift or the taking of hostages. Gaddafi has proven it, he hesitates before nothing. It is therefore important to neutralize him quickly because he becomes uncontrollable.
2° A political framework
From a political point of view, it is necessary to bring together a certain number of States, “large States” as François Fillon declared. That is to say the United States, France or the United Kingdom but also Russia, with the "benevolent neutrality" of China. This is where the choice of the operating organization appears essential. If from the outset, one can think of NATO, its use in a "civil war in the southern Mediterranean" would be a precedent that must be carefully examined. The precedent of Afghanistan does not really plead in its favor. AND the "forced passage" of Rasmussen in Budapest, during the informal Defense, was rather badly experienced by France in particular. Two other organizations could be called upon: the United Nations (but this implies a certain heaviness), the European Union (but it comes up against certain problems of association and does not have a position of military conduct unless resorting to that of a member state or NATO, and some states remain opposed to this).If neither of these organizations is selected, there are two options: a coalition (except to recall the Iraqi model) or the joint operation with the juxtaposition of several WEU/NATO organizations with the example of monitoring the embargo on arms, the Adriatic for example.
3° From a technical point of view"
The "monitoring is quite easy" indicates a soldier, if it is a "no fly zone", that is to say if we prohibit all planes from flying over the zone. On the other hand, it is more complicated if we do not prohibits only certain planes (for example those of the Libyan government of Gaddafi). Concretely, this supposes having a) an Awacs surveillance plane permanently in the air; b) interceptor planes supported by tanker planes; c ) support elements (tanker, etc.), d) command and intelligence resources; e) and above all an intervention doctrine.
On the Awacs side, it is therefore necessary to have a minimum of 24-3 planes for a H-4 permanence (such a plane flies about 8 hours). We can use the planes of the Alliance, based in Germany - but that supposes an agreement on their operational financing (we remember the long discussions on Afghanistan) - or the national means (France, UK, US).
To enforce this surveillance, with interception aircraft (Eurofighter, Rafale, Mirage...). We can then use the French base of Solenzara in Corsica (as for the Kosovo operation) or the NATO base of Sigonella, in Sicily. The first is about 1000 km from Tripoli, the second about 500 km. These are the most easily operational bases. There is also the British base, which is further away, 1800 km from Tripoli. You can also use Malta airport which is closer. But it could be complicated because the island already provides the "hub" for evacuations and humanitarian assistance and the government - which is not a member of NATO - may not necessarily agree. You can also use an aircraft carrier (Us or French). To monitor the southern side of Libya, it is also not forbidden to think (if Chad authorizes it) of being able to resort to French elements in Chad, if necessary by positioning them in Faya (Largeau)... if the track is still usable.
Command side
It is above all necessary to define a "concept" of operation: to define the "lines of engagement", the zone concerned, the duration in time of the operation, the action in the event of a hostile aircraft... These aircraft use a precise interception or even neutralization procedure if the aircraft is perceived as hostile. There is little time to decide whether to shoot down or let a plane pass. The "lines of engagement" must therefore be very clear. And the "pilots" must be "informed". A fully operational chain of command is therefore mandatory. And it is also important to preposition intelligence resources to identify possible "hostile" aircraft.
It is also necessary to define the covered area. It is essential to determine the means committed. If monitoring Tripoli or a few cities on the coast is "easy", monitoring the whole country which is quite vast and little known to Western forces (unlike the former Yugoslavia / Kosovo or Iraq) is more complex. Another factor: the duration of the operation over time. 1 or 2 Awacs for a few days is "easy, for a few weeks or several months, this makes it impossible to use these forces on other operations" specifies an airman.
Clearly, claiming a "no fly zone" is easy, implementing it presupposes resolving a certain number of questions beforehand. This presupposes unfailing political will and the unity of the main allies on this issue.
