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The London agreements claim a victim: Europe of Defense

General Sir David Richards, as head of ISAF, with French officers at Camp Bastion in Afghanistan (Credit: UK Ministry of Defense /: Con Coughlin)

What to think of the agreement signed on November 2 between France and the United Kingdom? We can look at it with a "pink" bezel - and the enamored eyes of the first romantic date -, or with a black bezel - of the old hand of international agreements who knows very well how long these rapprochements of circumstance last -. Personally, I will observe this agreement under the "blue" magnifying glass of European commitments. Does this agreement advance defense Europe, like the Saint-Malo agreement? Does he respect his European partners? Does he take into account the purely French promises of President Sarkozy to strengthen European Defense by fully reintegrating into NATO? We can doubt it...

"Pink" bezel...

It can be viewed with a "pink" bezel. This agreement is useful for Europe because it concerns the first two "military" players in Europe. This is a fact that cannot be denied. As the two protagonists point out, France and the United Kingdom represent, on their own, " half of the defense budgets of European countries and 2/3 of research and technology expenditure and they are among the few countries with the capacity and the will to take on the most demanding military missions ". It is, therefore, in a way, logical for both partners to " put (their) forces in a position to act together, optimize our capabilities and make our defense investment more profitable. These two great nations have always felt apart, in the European concert and joining forces, political convergence helping and economic necessity obliges, makes Churchill's dream become a reality...

... or "black" bezel?

It can be observed with a "black bezel". Franco-British cooperation is not based on a very advanced integration mechanism. It thus remains at the mercy of internal political and economic hazards. On many subjects, the commitments made by the two countries are very conditional and confine themselves to a laudable good intention, of the type "we are going to study what can be done" (for example on the tankers...) And we know what is the value of a "letter of intent" if it is not supported by a "bureaucratic" circuit. It is not certain that within two or three years, we will have forgotten certain aspects of it, or even that some will simply have been written off under the yoke of profit and loss. industrial and political and divergent interests.

Under the "blue" magnifying glass, a first victim: Europe of Defense

In this agreement, we can find an immediate victim: the Europe of Defense, as it was wanted and set up, ten years ago... precisely between the French and the British. It is even in itself an upside-down Saint-Malo agreement.

An upside-down Saint-Malo agreement

As much as the Saint-Malo agreement was intended to be a precursor, avant-garde, open to other European states, the "London agreements" are intended to be exclusive of other European nations and focused on bilateral projects. This was also one of the conditions set by the British for the signing of the agreement, as Hervé Morin recently reminded us (1). Not once, therefore, is the possibility of working at least partially at European level mentioned in the projects envisaged. As for the paragraph, on the European Union, it is the minimum service: the two partners say they support " the objectives and full implementation of the decisions taken in December 2008 by the European Council, under the French Presidency of the EU "," encourage closer cooperation and complementarity between the EU and NATO” and hope" further progress by the end of 2011”.

However, while several projects (nuclear, missiles, etc.) can only be conceived bilaterally, others are resolutely part of a European perspective (A400M training, satellite communication, etc.) and could interest other partners. By strengthening Franco-British cooperation, we de facto remove any interest in European cooperation in some of these areas. Similarly, one cannot help thinking that the high-level Franco-British working group, and the 100 million euros put on the table for Research and Technology, is carrying out work similar to that which a European Defense Agency somewhat reinforced.

As for the Franco-British "expeditionary" force (NB: the last time this term was used was for the failed intervention at Suez), it seems to want to be the counterpart of the Franco-German brigade and of the Eurocorps. Let's just hope it has more of a future than a few joint exercises and planning on paper. If this "force" takes the penalty as a battlegroup of the EU, for example in one of the spaces remained free, it will be useful. Otherwise, it will only be of very limited use for the EU, the United Kingdom still remaining reluctant to use force in this context. Maybe we can find a job somewhere in the Middle East on a UN mission...eventually.

And a broken promise

More than two years ago, at the NATO summit, when Nicolas Sarkozy and the French government endorsed the reintegration of France into the integrated command of the Alliance, this decision had to be accompanied - they declared - of a reinforcement of Defense Europe. Today, it is clear that if the first decision is in application and has found its cruising speed, the second is struggling to come into force, or even has not found the slightest beginning of execution. And the agreement signed on November 2 with the British certainly does not go in this direction.

Especially since the climate is gloomy to say the least for European Defense. It is a patent fact today that no project is "in the pipeline" on the PeSDC. All the interlocutors met confirm it or, at least, do not invalidate it. The High Representative of the EU, Cathy Ashton, seems to make European defense the least of her concerns (2). It is not London, with whom she corresponds regularly, that will motivate her in this direction. On the contrary... As a result, the European crisis management structures are running in a vacuum, without political instruction or impetus.

In this, the French decision is, indeed, both the breach of a promise but also a stab in the back of European Defense which did not need such treachery.

(1) What are the French and British really discussing?

(2) Economics or Politics as a vector of foreign policy?

Nicolas Gros Verheyde

Chief editor of the B2 site. Graduated in European law from the University of Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne and listener to the 65th session of the IHEDN (Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale. Journalist since 1989, founded B2 - Bruxelles2 in 2008. EU/NATO correspondent in Brussels for Sud-Ouest (previously West-France and France-Soir).

6 thoughts on “The London agreements claim a victim: Europe of Defense"

  • x.delcourt

    Excellent analysis, it seems to me, to be linked to the results of the memorable European Council last week. The economy under German colors, foreign policy and the PCSD set up by the United Kingdom. France one foot in the stirrup of each horse. In short, the big gap or the great dismemberment of Europe as an electoral track.
    Not really tenable over distance, nor for going out into the world.

  • v.france

    Totally agree with your analysis with nevertheless 2 remarks:
    – you judge the Suez affair as a failure, politically it was, but militarily it is a success, Franco-British planning, joint operation, single command…and the Egyptian army completely crushed. If the USSR had not threatened France and the UK…it would have been different but only the result counts
    – I think that France, which was the engine of the ESDP and then of the CSDP, has come to be disappointed, most of the countries of Europe no longer have any international will and think only of saving their industry from defence…it is logical for France and GB to act in coherence. It's up to the other European countries to wake up…for Germany, for example, by removing its geographical employment restrictions in Astan, and the same for Italy for the bombings by planes.
    cordially

  • I don't think this agreement can serve the interests of France in the long term...

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