Eusec Somalia: 14 million euros. And the OHQ in Nairobi?

(BRUSSELS2) The training assistance operation for Somali soldiers (Eutrain or Eusecfor) is relatively simple to set up, in the opinion of the military specialists in charge of the file. But, it is still necessary that choices be made, quickly, in order to be able to continue planning.

An approval in principle which remains to be specified. In fact, endorsement by the 27 Foreign and Defense Ministers,
Tuesday, of the concept of crisis management was above all a symbolic gesture. A political green light in principle. Much is still to be written. And, experts on the matter assured me, choices still have to be made "" to have a real strategic concept ". If these choices are made - " this could be done in the coming days » affirm several concurring sources, both in the EU and in certain Member States - « the joint action could then be adopted immediately, by the end of December ". The head of operation will then be appointed (a Spanish general since Spain has accepted the role of framework nation). And the definition of the Concept of Operation as well as the Operation Plan can be finalized. The operation would then be launched, probably in the spring (under the Spanish presidency). Unless a political pebble gets in the way (article to follow), the EU is, in any case, determined to speed up the operation. And the African partners
are waiting for him.

An ad hoc assembly. The assembly of the chain of command could be quite original for a military operation and closer to what is done for civilian missions. The relative operational simplicity of the mission does not require, in fact, to set up all the usual device of military operations, heavy and inadequate, for this type of mission (OHQ, FHQ...). There is, in fact, no operational deployment, no checkpoint or patrols. In Uganda, the military threat is limited and the risk, if not zero, is low. Then, if certain logistical questions may arise, they are not of the order of those posed in Chad.

A collected chain of command. Among the existing solutions, one can activate one of the 5 existing OHQs at the national level (Paris, Rome, Potsdam, Northwood, Larissa). Solution that seems difficult: It would cost more, take time and be a bit out of proportion to the conduct of the mission explains an officer. The only inexpensive and quick solution would be to add the OHQ to Northwood. " This would have a logic in the continuity of the Atalanta operation. But the two operations are actually very different. And Northwood seems far from the field. Another solution is to activate the General Staff OHQ. " This would make sense if we want to ensure the link with the European Commission”, and reinforce the global approach, " it has the advantage of being able to be put in place quickly - a few more officers at the General Staff, and it is inexpensive ". But... We know that this solution still comes up against a political veto from several Member States (with the United Kingdom in the lead). The last solution envisaged does not exist in the existing concepts but it has for the moment the favor of European officials. That would be a solution . There would be only one head of mission (and not an operation commander and a force commander). He could be based either on the spot in Uganda, or rather in Nairobi - near the African Union, and the command of Amisom, which would be very logical -, even if it means traveling to Brussels or to the training center in Uganda. As for the necessary command nucleus, it too would be fairly compact, of about twenty
people.

Tandem training with AMISOM. Cooperation with AMISOM still needs to be refined. But the idea would be to involve Africans, by giving them either certain training modules (which would be the easiest), or to associate them with existing modules.

"Logistical" cooperation with the Americans. The United States could not be associated as a third country but cooperate closely with the operation. The Americans are, in fact, already present in Uganda. They have "already provided training (NB: more or less directly and officially), they can provide equipment, weapons, and also air logistics to bring the Somalis to Uganda or bring them back to the field. explained a European diplomat to me. For the Europeans, this cooperation is important not only in logistical terms — it allows for faster planning — but this is also, and above all, a political gesture. After the Russians in Chad, the Americans in Uganda. »

A low cost. The operation should cost around 14 million euros (compared to the 3 million that the French operation in Djibouti cost). Which could not be more modest (the operation at sea costs one million euros per day on average). It would last for one year.