Rebels=Taliban=Al Qaeda, the simplistic and losing equation? of NATO

(BRUSSELS2) NATO Defense Ministers are currently meeting in Bratislava and will have a discussion at lunch on Friday about the commitment in Afghanistan. The organization's spokesman, James Appaturai, came to present to the press some ideas that the secretary general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, intends to develop tomorrow. And I fell to the ground.

That steals an egg... What does James say: “ In Afghanistan you cannot separate counterterrorism from counterinsurgency. To make Afghanistan able to resist terrorism for the long term, it must also be able to resist insurgency, because you cannot separate the Taliban from Al Qaeda. And you can't assume that they can be separated in the future. The Taliban were also al Qaeda in the past. There is no possible way that the Taliban will not be Al Qaeda in the future. » In short, a modernized version of who steals an egg, steals an ox, and who steals an ox kills his dog and slaughters the whole earth...

Re-engage! After his three-penny strategic analysis, Appaturai alias Rasmussen draws a conclusion “ A large effort must therefore be made at the civil and military level. Transition means putting the resources in place to quickly make the Afghan forces capable of conducting security, province by province, district by district. The Afghan forces have the lead and the NATO forces in support. This is the essence of transition. (...) We need more effort. And better coordination between the civilian and the military. ».

frightening ! Firstly, this postulate seems to me to go against what several experts are saying about the Afghan situation: very complex of course where it is difficult to disentangle the skeins. But where not every rebel is Taliban and not every Taliban is Al Qaeda. In short, they refine where Appaturai and Rasmussen grow. Secondly, we know very well that between the population and the insurgents, there are "bridges" (to be nice), logistical support (to be more precise), alternations sometimes (rebel at night, civilian during the day) . We could therefore complete the equation and arrive at civilians = terrorists. Which can then justify everything, including one or two erratic bombardments, or even more... If this approach should be maintained, I do not see how we will be able to convince public opinion to accept additional efforts, in men and funding for Afghanistan. On the long term, our populations will not follow. useless
to send reinforcements. Thirdly, one has the impression that NATO has learned nothing in a few years, that the latest strategic developments given with great media fanfare remain, in fact, the same. Nor of the lessons of the past, in particular of the Algerian war of independence and the attitude vis-a-vis the FLN. Fourth. I don't see how the Afghans will have the lead and the civilians will be able to engage serenely with a military organization that defends this type of approach. How to carry out a civil action, differentiated, if at the side, members of the same countries carry out a policy of "everyone in the same bag" and "all repressive"? Fifth. Having a civil-military action implies that the civilians have as much weight, if not more than the military in the definition of the strategy. That doesn't always seem to be the case! From a philosophical point of view, this approach does not seem to me really compliant to the objectives of
the EU.
(listen to the explanation, it starts after 4'30 minutes)