To understand European defence: “the chorus of the debate”

Written by a French rear-admiral and a Franco-British, in two versions (English and French), this 82-page work has an essentially educational aim: to make the issues and tools of Defense Europe understood, without forgetting to explain the difficulties or expectations. And this goal is achieved. The authors know what they are talking about. The former headed the EU office of the General Staff in Paris during the French presidency of the EU (he is now in Riyadh at the head of the French joint military mission); above all, he was among the first French officers assigned to the EU headquarters in Brussels. The second is at RUSI, the Royal United Services Institute in London, responsible for the European security program; he was previously a consultant at Frost & Sullivan's, worked for Jane's (the defense publishing house) and worked at the Department of Strategic Affairs of the Ministry of Defence. The illustrations - the least of which is undoubtedly this satirical map by the Frenchman Paul Hadol, dating from 1870, showing the European States seeking to dominate each other -, come to support their demonstration, this rapid course in all the realities of Defense Europe. Enlightening because he does not forget to put his finger on procrastination or divergences.

Europe at the limit of its means of action

Europe in ten years has developed, explain the authors: "doctrinal foundations, capacities for evaluating situations and collective decision-making, means of action. (But) limits have been reached in (these) three components. Progress now comes up against the need for a deeper strategic vision but also the difficulties or reluctance of Nation States to invest their national defense tools in favor of a more effective capacity for collective action.". Among the avenues for potential development, the authors cite as follows: "the European white paper, the setting up of a permanent operations headquarters in Brussels, the increase in the share of funding for operations, of the budget of the European Defense Agency, and the establishment of military relations between EU and USA". Because "so far Washington has always refused to take the Euro-American military relationship outside of NATO".

The question of the permanent operations HQ: a practical necessity.

The authors underline this necessity, showing the difficulties.
• "The use of national operations headquarters (there are five: at Mont-Valérien FR, Northwood UK, Potsdam DE, Rome IT, Larissa GR) is sensitive to the number of planners available in the Member States. (...) Frequent trips - which represented tens of thousands of euros for the Eufor Tchad/RCA operation are necessary for the consultation between the authorities and planners of the HQ and the politico-military bodies of the EU, despite the proximity between Paris and Brussels. The cost incurred by a more distant Operation HQ potentially increases accordingly.
• "If the SHAPE (NB: in Mons - Belgium) offers a permanent solution, the procedure linked to the partnership between the EU and NATO is proving to be both cumbersome and complex. Nine months were therefore necessary to plan Operation Althea (Bosnia-Herzegovina) in 2004.
• "The option of the EU operations center in Brussels has not yet been used, although it has been tested in exercise. It relies on a substantial reinforcement of around forty officers provided by the EU General Staff, which inevitably penalizes it for carrying out its other tasks. The idea of ​​creating a permanent nucleus has been relayed (...) This is one of the most controversial developments of European defense since it would result in a substantial leap in the military effectiveness of the EU."

The danger of duplication: between NATO and the EU or between member states?

The authors explain in particular that the competition between NATO and the EU - "marked by a strong sense of existential threat" - is no longer relevant. Operation after operation, "an empirical clarification has been made". And the fear of duplication does not seem serious today. "The EU military personnel comprises around 200 people who cannot duplicate the 12.000 posts which constitute the permanent NATO command structure." The authors can thus put their feet in the dish: "the real duplications are those that exist between Member States (...) why maintain so many chains of command and national logistics and equipment organizations that are still insufficiently interoperable? Why not further pool or pool training and resources in a necessarily constrained budgetary context?
• "Defense Europe. The Debate Choir"/"European Defence. Breaking new ground" -Alastair Cameron, Jean-Francois Morel (Preface by Javier Solana) (Editions l'Harmattan, Paris, October 2009, 82 pages, 12 euros).