Some lessons from Europeans
(B2) When we see the results of the European election, the results are clear: the European Parliament is sliding even further to the right. The left (PSE, Greens, Ultra Left and Communists) has only around 35% of the seats. The classic right (European People's Party, New Eurosceptic Party, Liberals and Democrats) has 61% of the seats. NB: These are figures to be validated later with a provisional classification of certain parties.
As for theabstention, it is less pronounced than expected. Two points less compared to 2004. But the shift remains continuous. And it will be necessary without delay to study the means of making this election more “attractive”, the stakes clearer.
The overall winner is undoubtedly the European People's Party. It widens the gap with the Socialist Party (about 120 seats, against 70 today). And it is only with the announced split of the Eurosceptics (British Conservatives, Czechs) that this gap would be reduced to 90-100 seats. He therefore has a wide choice of alliances. And can reach almost an absolute majority with just the Liberals or the Eurosceptic Party.
On the right, always, the new eurosceptic party could become the fourth largest party - everything will depend on its "pickup field". It would thus reach approximately 90 seats.
L'far right which manages to establish itself in several countries, particularly in the United Kingdom (with 2 offices), could constitute a group. Even if in France and Belgium, two of its usual bastions, it is clearly settling (-5 points in Belgium, - 3 points in France). In fact, everything will depend on the ability of the various extremist parties to get along. They could then
cross the bar of the 25 deputies necessary.
Libertas lists don't work. 0,92% in the Czech Republic, less than 5% in Ireland. All this noise for nothing.
On the left, the fall of the PS weighs down the results.
Le Socialist Party crashes almost everywhere, especially in large countries. In the United Kingdom, it is the spectacular debacle, going from 22% to 15%, with 11 seats (-8 seats) (**). The Brown government suffered the wear and tear of time and the campaign of the expenses of the deputies which damaged him. The fall is general wherever there is power, alone or in coalition: brutal in Portugal (-5 seats) and the Netherlands (-4 seats), serious in Spain (-4 seats, -5 points), in Belgium (- 2 seats) and in Germany (-1 seat but from an already bad result in 2004). The PES is only making progress in Sweden, Denmark, the Czech Republic and Greece. The astonishing fact is France too, where the PS in the opposition, which had up to now more or less won all the last local elections (regional, departmental, municipal), normally had the free way. But, as in 2002, as in 2007, he failed in the national election. A failure as serious as that of the British. Because it only arrives with difficulty at 16%, preceding the Greens by a small head... In fact, the result is quite simply reversed compared to 2004 (the PS had made nearly 29% and the UMP 16% ).
The Green are the big winner on the left, now clearly ahead of the ultra-left, with good progress in several countries: spectacular in France where the Cohn Bendit list is
equal game with the PS (14 seats), but also clear in Belgium (+ 1 seat), in Sweden (+ 1 seat), etc. The group in the EP could reach (or exceed) 50 seats.
L'ultra-left derives little benefit from the crisis. His group remains with a similar workforce: just over 40 seats.
Comment: If there is not yet clearly a European electorate, we can identify some trends: faced with the crisis, voters have chosen a reassuring choice, the choice of the good father, the Christian Democrats; the personalization of the lists (Cohn Bendit in France, Dedecker in Belgium, ) makes it possible to hang the votes. And we also identify territorial differences. In this context, the choice of the PSE - by not presenting an alternative to the EPP, which had clearly indicated its choice for Barroso, or even by rallying to this candidate - is a serious error: because it gives the assent that we shares the same policy, and it goes against the electorate. By refusing the personalization of the ballot, believing that with a few ideas distilled here and there, that would be enough.
(**) BBC forecast
