Lessons from the Georgian conflict for the EU: the Russians' “failure” move
(B2) Russia isolated, Russia sanctioned? Not so fast… The Russian military advance in Georgia first, and the recognition of the independence of the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, then, testify to an asserted, thoughtful strategic desire on the part of Russia. Who calculated, like a chess player, the risks of this new positioning and the possible reactions of the adversary. As in 1991, there is an acceleration of history, with a recomposition of certain spaces of influence, particularly in the regions of frozen conflicts, between the West and the East. In this first round, Russia seems to have succeeded in its coup. It agreed to sacrifice, momentarily, pieces of the game that it considered useless or obsolete (the peaceful image) in order to regain others (power in particular). With Western eyes, we can judge this attitude suicidal. But we must not consider today's Russia as that of the 1990s or 2000s, very Atlanticist. But rather as a more traditional, more imperial, more oriental Russia. With the Medvedev-Putin couple, a new Russia is being born, incontestably, which is repositioning itself in the international context. By reclaiming its place in the world, it offers a clear alternative to the American omnipotence of the last twenty years. Without giving in to the emotion of the moment, we can identify seven "new pieces" in this Russian game.
1° Power. Russia has once again become a "power" to be reckoned with. This country, once powerful, has not really counted on the international scene since 1991. The West was able to tie Central Europe to the European Union, bomb Serbia, intervene in Iraq or Afghanistan, without its real agreement. With its coup in Georgia, it has managed to make up for these twenty years of impotence. NATO has suffered a defeat.
2° An alternative umbrella. Russia is an alternative offer to the other power that is the United States. The message is clear: if you have a problem with the United States, we have a well-trained army, a strong political will, oil, gas, and above all military equipment to sell. In short, Russia offers a strategic "umbrella" to any state that wants to free itself from American pressure. Some countries (like Syria) have not been mistaken. Others could follow.
3° A renewed military industrial offer. The Russian army has, here, made a pro domo demonstration. By asserting itself as a credible military industrial alternative, Russia is becoming, in the long term, a dangerous competitor for the Western military industry (European or American). The contracts signed are multiplying. Global demand is significant. And the return of an arms race could be profitable for this industry which needs markets to develop and modernize. And Russian industry has a competitive advantage: price. "The upgraded equipment is very close to the latest (Western) designs. And half the price." says Vladimir Paleshchuk from the service of military and technical cooperation in Novosti.
4° The return of the notion of borders. The comparison with the Cold War holds on this point: not block against block (which supposes opaque borders) but zone against zone. There is an extensive western zone, member of the European Union and/or NATO, clearly asserted. And a Russian zone which asserts itself. Then a speed race to catch up with a few countries or pieces of territory in these areas. Belarus, Georgia, Moldova in the "Russian zone". Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia, in the European zone. There are still a few countries to compete for, starting with the biggest: Ukraine. The Georgian crisis certainly constitutes a very clear warning to countries which would go "on the other side".
5° A more eastern axis. Of course there is collateral damage in terms of image. But for the moment they remain limited to the West. And above all low compared to the potential gains. What it loses in the West, Russia can regain in the East. There is a rebalancing of Russian strategy here. Less Atlanticist. More Asian. Opportunities for investment and growth are no longer found only in the West but also in other countries (India, Indonesia, China, with which Russia has recently signed numerous contracts). The ambassador to NATO, Rogozin said recently: we are no longer in a bipolar world but a multipolar one.
6° The reformatting of links with the West. Russia needs Westerners, of course. But the opposite is also true. And that is one of the goals sought: Russia must be treated on an equal footing with the United States. The Russians did not hesitate to point this out. Not without reason. Russia is in a position of strength over the West in Afghanistan: the UN Security Council must extend, in September, the mission of the international coalition (IFAS). And NATO had concluded an agreement with the Russians for the transit of certain materials by road or air, within Russian space (which made it possible to resupply its present troops more quickly and less expensively). In Chad, the Europeans still rely on Russian helicopters to carry out their mission. Just as the UN needs the Russians in Darfur (a concern very close to the hearts of the British). Not to mention Russian oil, gas and the investment and development capabilities that the country offers. Capabilities all the greater as its territory, its empire and its zone of influence are extended.
7° A capacity for reasoned action. The word may seem out of place. But when we look at the ceasefire agreement, we see an evolution compared to Soviet interventions (Budapest 1956, Prague 1968, Afghanistan 1979). The Russians know how to stop before it's too late. They did not thus invade all of Georgia (and its capital, which seemed within reach, a priori). What stopped them? : the European Union plan. The drop in the stock market which reminded certain officials of economic realism... Or a well-defined plan which did not plan to go through to the end... Or a bit of all three.
(NGV)
Photo credit: OSCE Georgia – Gori on August 21
Contrary to what you state in the 7th point, from my readings, I retain that modern Russia, the USSR, and even Imperial Russia, homeland of chess, had a great talent in geo-political strategy, and a a certain affection for – moderate forceful blows -.
In the events of the past few days, I find many coincidences with the crisis in Cuba. In particular on the context, the real motivations of Russia, and certainly in the outcome or the consequences...
The coup in Cuba had allowed the USSR, at the end of the crisis, to release the pressure of NATO containment, and to reduce diplomatic tension. This was followed by the START 1 & 2 agreements, the NPT, and so many other agreements concerning Antarctica, space, etc.
The Georgia coup seems to me to be a way for Russia to purge the frustrations accumulated in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In any case, we are very far from the start of a new Cold War, quite the contrary.