[Yugoslavia Memory of a disaster] Hannes Swoboda (Aut): a possible preventive strategy (itv)
Austrian Socialist. Hannes Swoboda Member of the European Parliament since 1996, member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and Vice-President (since 1997) of the EP Delegation for relations with the countries of South-East Europe.
How did you feel in 1990-91? In the ruling coalition, there were differences. For us social democrats, the Balkans was a thing of the past, a done deal. For the Christian Democrats, it was slightly different. For a Catholic man like Alois Mock (nb: the Minister of Foreign Affairs), Croatia was more important. We had told our French friends that it was impossible to keep Yugoslavia. Separatist tendencies in Slovenia and Croatia were very strong.
What should be done? A preventive strategy of the European Community, including Austria, would have allowed a more peaceful process of separation, as between the Czech Republic and Slovakia or, later, between Serbia and Montenegro. This is in my opinion the biggest mistake. The question was not to say Ok for the separation, but to accompany it. A limited military intervention, incorporated by NATO and under the umbrella of the UN would then have made it possible to have a discussion, to have the possibility of a peaceful process of discussion.
What is Europe's flaw? The European Community was not founded to stabilize the neighborhood but to bring peace between its members. This has certain consequences with our neighbours, the refugees... The new European strategy is not to go with military forces, to make settlements, but to stabilize these areas. But this intervention must link the military (as in Kosovo), the police, the reconstruction of institutions and the rule of law, and bring about a change of state of mind in the population. It doesn't happen in a year. We must therefore avoid intervening for one or two years and then withdraw. It still wouldn't make sense.
Is Europe better prepared today? We have no military structure, except NATO. We no longer have any legal or military instruments. And member states are not ready to change that. There is resistance from several governments. With national rules, different commands, nothing effective can be done. Having common rules for military intervention is not just a matter of goodwill. If groups recreate a national liberation army or terrorist groups, we will face a difficult situation.
Today, for Kosovo, do you fear a skid? I do not believe. We feared events after the decision of the United Nations to prolong the discussions in May – June 2007. And there was not that. (...) The Serbs would not be happy with Kosovo, they will have a permanent conflict. They might formally have Kosovo, but no influence on it. (...) If they seek to separate Rep Srbska, they will also have new problems.
The Serbs do not accept it? We must put pressure on the Serbs to promote a solution in Kosovo. We cannot ask them to accept this solution, but they must not hinder it. In Europe we have had conflicts which have only just been resolved, several years later, look at Ireland and the United Kingdom it is very recent - or is not yet (the Eta). I remain quite optimistic. If the treaty is ratified and Croatia returns in 2011, we will have a process with accession to the European Union by 2014-2015.
(NGV)
(Interview carried out on August 28, 2007 face-to-face)