[Interview] Yugoslavia Memory of a disaster – Doris Pack: no one seriously believed in war

(B2) Doris Pack, German MEP (CDU / PPE-DE) since 1989. She is one of the best specialists in the Balkans, of which she has followed all upheavals, as vice-president of the delegation with Yugoslavia then the former Yugoslavia (until 1994), and president of the Parliament's delegation on South East. 

NB: this article is part of a series started in 2007 to try to define the European responsibilities in drama in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

 

Why was there no reaction in the early 1990s?
Naturally, we should have reacted after 1989 when Milosevic abolished Kosovo's autonomy. But we didn't take Milosevic seriously, we didn't believe he could achieve what he promised the Serbs. (on the other hand) Everyone believed him when he said that he could save Yugoslavia. He was a great actor. We didn't really believe that Yugoslavia was going to disappear. We supported Ante Markovic (the pro-European Prime Minister), who had promised a lot of things, was a European, who supported the market... And then we were preoccupied elsewhere. At the same time, we had the reunification of Germany. We were busy with our problems inside which were not easy to digest.

What were the official comments? How did we react back then?
The first time I was in Belgrade, I saw the German ambassador who told me: “You have to keep Yugoslavia. Between the Slovenes and the Croats, it's only a game, it's going to stop. As for Kosovo, that does not concern us”. All the ambassadors said, more or less the same thing to their capitals: “don't get involved ". We didn't really help the democratic Yugoslavs. We did not succeed in persuading the Serbs in this way that we had to find another way than war, for example by removing more centralization. We realized it too late.

The Germans, however, pushed for independence?

No. At first, the Germans were like the others. They weren't specifically for independence. And then, we saw Vukovar and the bombardments of Zagreb. It alerted us. We (the Germans) simply helped, after October 1991, to recognize the facts quite simply. (...) Europe did not have a common view on the situation in the Balkans. We weren't used to looking at Yugoslavia with a neutral view. The French and the English looked at this with their eyes of the Second World War, ranking the countries between allies and non-allies. We Germans started from scratch, without having any idea of ​​a greater Germany. And we no longer thought in those terms. I believe that the English and French did not have, like us, the “duty to change policy” (after the 2nd World War).

So we let it happen?
Yes. For four years, we did nothing. The Krajina Serbs even shelled Bihac. We let everything happen and we didn't help the Croats. Tudjman recovered weapons, rebuilt his army with the help of the Americans and reconquered the lost territories. (...) The same thing happened with Bosnia. We didn't want to get involved. We did not intervene. Not because they were Muslims, as Europe was once accused. No, the truth is, we didn't want to get involved. Europe was not prepared to make a war for this. Europe simply hadn't been to war since World War II. She was not ready to help the peoples. (…) It took Srebrenica and the help of America to walk the path together. And in 1998, we (finally) had a common approach. This was the German idea of ​​a Stability Pact.

Independence for Kosovo?
Now making a democratic government digest Milosevic's legacy is harder. Independence had to be achieved immediately, after the war in Kosovo. If we had found a solution immediately, it would have been easy. This is the Europeans' problem with the Balkans: we have always been afraid to go further. After the previous ones (bombings), we didn't want to hurt Milosevic and the Serbs any more. Currently (July 2007), I see no other solution than independence. They (the Kosovars) have been waiting since 1989 (end of autonomy) and 1999. The Americans have always been for this independence.

And the Russians?
IThey are using the veto over Serbia to piss us off and gain power. There is also fear of an identical situation in Transnistria.

(NGV)

(interview conducted on July 3, 2007 face-to-face, with Ernest Bunguri)