[Interview] Yugoslavia Memory of a disaster – Alain Lamassoure: French diplomacy was rubbish

(B2) This article is part of a series started in 2007 to try to define the European responsibilities in drama in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

A predictable crisis.

The explosion of Yugoslavia was an event foreseen, foreseeable and announced by its actors. French diplomacy and, François Mitterrand, carry an important weight. Mitterrand particularly despised and underestimated the actors in this conflict. It was quite an outlandish reaction. While the man was deeply committed at the European level, in monetary matters for example, he reacted as if we were 80 years back, in 1913, in a reflex of France's traditional alliance with Serbia. Which is insane and hard to understand…

How did you discover the Yugoslav "problem"?

It was in April 1991, I was then spokesperson for the UDF, we received half a dozen people representing Slovenia. We hardly knew at the time that Slovenia existed and where it was. And I see a sort of “Jesus Christ” arrive, in a suit and tie, Alojz Peterle (now a European deputy) who, in a very soft voice, says to me: “ I am the Prime Minister of Slovenia. Here are my ministers. I tour Europe, governments and oppositions. We organized a referendum which resulted in 80% of the population wanting independence. From next June 24, we will proclaim it. We are negotiating with the federal ministries in Belgrade for independence, things are going well with certain Ministers (education, etc.), but with Defence, things are going badly. It is probable that there will be a war in Europe ". I was taken aback, we took note. I phoned the Quai d'Orsay (the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Nobody was interested. I even wondered if it was all really serious. However, we received an official letter from the Slovenians thanking us for the audience. And... more news. Some time later, on June 24 in the morning, I shave in the morning, I listen to the news and I learn that there is war in Europe.

Community reaction?

The first European reaction was good – especially since we had no common foreign policy, just political cooperation. We had gone, with a small group in August 1991, to meet the leaders of the Yugoslav republics: we saw before our eyes Yugoslavia burst. And war broke out in Croatia, with the bombardment of Vukovar. The French ambassador was scandalously useless; he told us : " You get caught up in Croatian propaganda, we burn old tires to make it look like the city is burning "... In Sarajevo, all the political parties begged us not to hold a referendum on independence: " If we organize it, there will be two-thirds Yes to independence. But the Serbs who do not agree will take their weapons the next day (and in 201 out of 208 communes, there was a mixture of the three communities present in all the villages). If there is a war, it will be terrible, we will fight in all the villages and towns ».

And then Europe slips... The project of political Europe explodes the Europeans, just when Dubrovnik is surrounded, at the end of September? 

Indeed, if there is a moment when we can say that there is a loss of control, it is this September 30, 1991. It is indisputable that the debate on political union has polluted the debate on Yugoslavia.

Why are you so hard on this French negation?

France began by denying the right to independence. We had before us a population that is holding a referendum and 80% say "we want to be independent". What legitimacy would we have to refuse what is only the expression of the right of peoples to self-determination. Jacques Delors himself was out of it: in July 1991, he said: "the Slovenes are crazy, how a country of two million inhabitants which does not really have an outlet on the sea, can have independence." [...] France considered (afterwards) that, if there was a break-up, all Republics should have the right to take their independence – under the influence of Badinter, and even of Jacques Delors, who completely broke up "planted", you have to admit...

And the European division?

Germany, Austria, the Vatican were furious; the European Community at the December 1991 Summit arrives divided. This very strong division was also present in the European Parliament. The British were opposed to the French proposal for military interposition (Germany was not keen on having troops in the Balkans either), they replied: it's NATO or nothing. As a result, it was nothing. Or rather, it was the time of the “ice cream sellers”. These few dozen observers who were watching. Then we entered a UN circuit.

The real turning point policy arrived in 1995 with Jacques Chirac who said " We stop ". He went to see the Americans, to ask them to intervene. We started shooting at the Serbs. And they put their thumbs up. For the Serbian army was not as formidable as has been said. This was well known in military circles. But we didn't want to commit...

And today ?

We were useless when Yugoslavia broke up and we continue to be. For what ? As we say that it is foreign policy, therefore intergovernmental, and not community, the European Commission and the European Parliament feel relieved of this task. As Clinton rightly said, it's your back home, it isn't mine ". [...] In October 2006, I am in Washington, I see Dan Fried (Under-Secretary of State, in charge of Europe and Russia), I wanted to send him the message on the constitutional reform in France ( which has consequences for Turkey). Above all, he answers Kosovo: “ We have to settle Kosovo” he told me. I realized that they were the Americans who realized that (the) Dayton agreement was no longer working, and that we had to " find a solution for Serbia and settle the question of Bosnia, which remains intact ».

And now the accession of the Balkans?

I say "Yes" to the accession of the Balkans, together, en bloc or spread over time. But they must have solved their internal problems before joining, as the Czech Republic and Slovakia did, and not reproduce what we did for Cyprus. It is not by going to the Union that we solve the problems. (...) We must also explain to new arrivals that there is an unwritten rule when we enter the Union, which is that we no longer talk about the past: the homeland is the land of our fathers, Europe the land of our children. Between a Frenchman and a German, we never talk about the past again. It's a taboo. History should be left to historians. Otherwise we cannot build Europe. To use the word of Jesus in St Matthew "come, follow me, and let the dead bury the dead".

(Comments collected by Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

Alain Lamassoure is now a Member of the European Parliament. A European parliamentarian, he had already been one from 1989 to 1993, before becoming one again from 1999. In the meantime, he was Minister Delegate for European Affairs (1993 – 1995, Balladur government), then for the Budget and spokesperson for the Government. French (1995 – 1997 Juppe government).

(interview carried out on July 3, 2007 face-to-face in Strasbourg)