Chechnya, fake sanctions on Russia, decryption

(meeting notes, January 2000 - unpublished)

(Chronology of events)

At the European Summit in Helsinki on 10 and 11 December 1999, the 15 Heads of State and Government of Europe take a decision, described as firm vis-à-vis Russia:
It begins with “The European Council condemns and finds the intense shelling of Chechen towns totally unacceptable”.
It ends with “the European Council decides to draw the consequences of this situation:
- for the implementation of the European Union's common strategy towards Russia, which should be reviewed;
- for the partnership and cooperation agreement, part of whose provisions should be suspended and the trade provisions strictly applied;
- for the TACIS programme, the budgetary authority is invited to consider transferring funds from TACIS for humanitarian aid. Budget allocations for 2000
should be limited to the priority areas, namely human rights, the rule of law, support for civil society and nuclear safety.
It invites the Presidency and the Secretary-General/High Representative to notify this decision and the content of this declaration as a matter of urgency to the Russian authorities at the highest level.
It invites the OSCE and the Council of Europe to review, each in its respective area of ​​competence, the modalities of their co-operation with Russia.

To the General Affairs Council (24 January 2000)
It takes two months for the 15 foreign ministers to implement these measures. It was not until January 24 that the Fifteen,
meeting in the General Affairs Council, issue a declaration. Which seems grotesque...

A statement full of sinuosities. The Fifteen began by “welcoming the democratic conduct of the legislative elections”. The statement goes on to point out that
“Russia is a partner of prime importance for the EU”. The European Union, moreover, "would like to continue to consolidate and develop this long-term strategic partnership
with the aim of improving security and stability in Europe and beyond”. It is only in the third paragraph that the words "human rights, rule of law and freedom of
information and media”. And in the fourth paragraph, the Council admits all the same that the European Union "is deeply concerned by the continuation of the violence in Chechnya and reiterates its
condemnation of the indiscriminate use of force by the Russian authorities which has aggravated the humanitarian situation”. But, immediately startled no doubt by this audacious position, the paragraphs
following are used to mitigate this small spike. "The Council does not dispute Russia's right to preserve its territorial integrity" It is satisfied that "Mr. Putin has given the assurance
that he would keep the EU fully informed of Russia's position on developments and how it meets international standards.” And it is only from
seventh paragraph that the Union announce the sanctions envisaged.

.... the difficulty of admitting sanctions. And yet the ministers of foreign affairs are trying to lessen the blow considerably. As summarized, then, Hubert Védrine, the
24 January: “The dialogue with Russia must be continued. It is just as important for the European Union as for France. But, at the same time, our position must be
clear and unambiguous, we must take into account the position taken in Helsinki".
The problem actually lies there. How are the ministers of foreign affairs going to be able to get by with what the 15 heads of state have decided, in a slightly too generous spirit?
This is what a Portuguese diplomat summed up (Portugal currently holds the presidency of the European Union): "we must not thwart the efforts in progress, it would be harmful and
productive to do something. (...) Anyway, if there is a budget measure, it will take a long time to have an effect, it takes one or a year and a half. (...) As for reducing the number
of high-level contacts, when there are two representatives of European foreign ministers currently in Russia ( ) it's tough. In fact, the whole difficulty is not to
judge what was done in Helsinki".
The European Commission, realistically, prefers not to speak of “sanctions”, but of “measures”. One of its members recognizes that the initial catalog of measures was more
important. But several States, including France, Spain, Germany, were hostile to too strong sanctions. Only the British and Danes, and to a lesser extent the Finns,
supported a more supportive position. So we had to negotiate.
Some people close to the case acknowledge that "The Helsinki mandate allowed us to go further on the cooperation agreements but there was no political will" and that if the
Commissioner for External Relations, the Englishman Chris Patten, had not made the forcing "the ministers would have been satisfied with the language of Helsinki without measures and basta".

The Catalog of Sanctions
Six measures are planned. But whose harmlessness is as important as a drop of unpolluted water in a sewer.

Three sanctions are financial

1° • The most symbolic measure, the reorientation of the Tacis program ( ) towards democratic values ​​and civil society is not yet effective. And may not be for several
years. Certainly the decision of principle is well acquired. But the terms and conditions remain to be specified, which can only be determined by a management committee. This committee will not meet on an emergency basis.
The first results could thus only be known in a few months. And even ! If there is any reorientation, it concerns only the programs exclusively intended for Russia, the
cross-border cooperation programs with neighboring countries (Ukraine, Belarus, etc.) may continue to take place. But above all, this reorientation concerns only the 2000 budget.
type of financing is only really committed two or three years after the budget year to which it is attached. We are currently in the process of making calls for tenders on the 1998 and 1999 budgets
(cf. official journal of 21 December on a call for cross-border cooperation for small projects).
A few more deaths, even one or two more prime ministers, will cross Russia before this sanction is effective!
Figures: Of the 500 million Euros from the Tacis programme, 130 million Euros go to Russia. 90 million could be reallocated.

2° • A second sanction aims at not carrying over a food aid supplement from 1999 to the 2000 budget. Apart from the fact that this measure is very symbolic (approximately 30 million Euros), it
especially that little impact on Chechnya. From a confirmed diplomatic source, it is believed that this measure is more motivated by the fight against the mafia. At the European Commission, the
Spokesman for Chris Patten (Commissioner for External Relations) refuses to confirm this explanation but it is estimated that "the Russians no longer need food aid, because they have a
very good balance of payments and can therefore acquire these needs on the market”.

3° • In fact, the only sanction that has actually come into force is the stricter monitoring of trade agreements. But does it really have to do with Chechnya? Because the measures of
retaliation are provided for even by these agreements when one of the partners does not respect it. At the Commission, moreover, it is recognized that "The measure follows a commercial logic, it follows a
litigation on export taxes which has existed for several years" Thus on January 26, the Commission proposed to "reduce by 20% for the year 2000 (ceilings) for imports of
certain steel products from the Russian Federation”. Reason: "This decision follows the introduction by the Russian Federation in April 1999 of a customs duty
temporary 15% hit on its exports of scrap metal and iron and steel waste. A clear breach of the commitments entered into by the Russian Federation under the agreement
signed in 1997 between the European Coal and Steel Community and the Russian Federation on trade in certain steel products. »

The other sanctions mainly concern suspensions of trading:

4° - revision of the work plan for the implementation of the common strategy of the European Union;

5° - suspension of the signing of a scientific and technological agreement;

6° - .suspension of the examination of a possible extension of the generalized preference systems to Russia (60 million Euros are concerned but 120 million Euros continue to be
applicable);
In these cases, the agreements are not cancelled, it is the formalization or negotiation of the agreement that is suspended.

The (non) position of the Council of Europe
As for the Council of Europe, its cowardice in the face of the possible exclusion of Russia is matched only by its loud talk as long as it is not a question of voting. So, after hinted, in a report,
on January 25, that Russia could be excluded from its ranks, the next day the parliamentary assembly of the institution certainly gave birth to a declaration, certainly very combative, but no case
of an exclusion. The conditions will be examined at the next session of the Assembly (3-7 April).