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European Union Committee

8th Report of Session 2010–11

The EU's Afghan Police Mission

Report with Evidence

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CONTENTS

	<i>Paragraph</i>	<i>Page</i>
Summary		5
Chapter 1: The Mission's Mandate	1	9
Introduction	1	9
Mission origins and composition	5	9
Table 1: Number of seconded staff by participating country		10
Mandate and strategic objectives	10	11
Chapter 2: The Operating Environment	14	13
The security and development context	14	13
Box 1: EU Support for Afghanistan		13
Training and mentoring the Afghan National Police (ANP)	16	14
Box 2: International Police Training Missions in Afghanistan, including the NATO Mission (NTM-A)		14
The Afghan National Police (ANP)	18	15
Police traditions	19	15
The problems	20	16
Illiteracy, drug-taking and human rights	24	17
Attrition rate	28	18
Corruption, organised crime, infiltration	32	18
The local auxiliary police	38	19
Women and gender issues	43	21
Building police links with the judiciary	46	21
Chapter 3: International Cooperation and the Role of the Police	51	23
Different perceptions of policing	51	23
EUPOL's relations with other actors	59	25
Cooperation with NATO on the security of EUPOL personnel	65	26
The Afghan government decree on private security contractors	70	27
Chapter 4: EUPOL's Administration	72	28
Understaffing	73	28
Accommodation problems	77	29
The Brussels-Mission relationship	84	30
Box 3: EUPOL Command and Control Arrangements		30
Budget flexibility and procurement	87	31
Chapter 5: The Way Ahead	91	32
Retrenchment and re-focus	91	32
Withdrawal—timetables	96	33
Chapter 6: Conclusions and Recommendations	106	35
Appendix 1: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development Policy (EU Sub-Committee C)		39
Appendix 2: List of Witnesses		40

Appendix 3: Memorandum by Dr Ronja Kempin, Head of EU External Relations, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin	41
Appendix 4: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations	48
Appendix 5: Map of EUPOL Posts in Afghanistan	50

Oral Evidence

<i>Fatima Ayub, Open Society Foundation</i>	
Oral Evidence, 14 October 2010	1
<i>Chief Superintendent Nigel Thomas, Former Interim Head of the EU's Afghan Police Mission</i>	
Oral Evidence, 21 October 2010	13
<i>Alistair Burt MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Karen Pierce, Director for South Asia and Afghanistan and Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and James Kariuki, European Correspondent and Head of Europe Global Group, Foreign and Commonwealth Office</i>	
Oral Evidence, 28 October 2010	28
Supplementary Memorandum	40
Supplementary Memorandum	41
Supplementary Memorandum	41
Supplementary Memorandum	42
Supplementary Memorandum	42
Supplementary Memorandum	43
Supplementary Memorandum	44
Supplementary Memorandum	45
<i>Kees Klompenhouwer, Head of EU Civilian Missions</i>	
Oral Evidence, 4 November 2010	46

References in footnotes to the Report are as follows:

- Q refers to a question in oral evidence
 APM refers to written evidence as listed in Appendix 2

SUMMARY

The mission

EUPOL entered the field in 2007, six years after the initial invasion of Afghanistan. It grew out of a German-led mission which was not capable of reaching the goals which had been set.

Given the fundamental importance of civil structures for Afghanistan and civilian policing in particular, the need for a police training mission was obvious. It remains clear that this was an area where the EU could make a leading contribution.

It may not have been the EU's fault that the mission was late but this was compounded by a low degree of commitment by the EU to providing staff; problems in the Afghan police of illiteracy, corruption and desertion; and the overall security situation in the country. There is a real risk that the EU will fail in an area where it should show leadership.

In future missions the EU must decide whether it wants to make a serious contribution to solving civilian and police matters. If it does, the EU should ensure that such missions are at a level that has a significant effect on outcomes. Earlier participation is essential (paragraphs 5–7, 20–37, 61, 73–83).

Levels of staffing

The planned size of the EU mission of 400 was always too small to make a major difference to civilian outcomes in Afghanistan, and compares badly to the American and NATO commitment to the broader police training effort.

However, even this target has never been met, with numbers in the high 200s being typical. Apart from the lack of EU commitment that this demonstrates to allies, it also means that the mission cannot extend across important parts of Afghanistan.

The fact that the level of EUPOL staff has been significantly lower than planned means that EUPOL illustrates EU weakness rather than strength. There is still time to correct this for the remainder of the mission.

To retain any credibility, the proper level of staffing must be met. However, if this cannot be achieved within a reasonable timeframe, the EU should as a last resort revise EUPOL's mandate (paragraphs 5, 7, 73–83, 91, 92, 94, Box 2).

Size does count

The size of the EUPOL mission—in both people and budget—is relatively small compared with the NATO-led coalition's commitment to police training. This has affected the relationship. The Committee believes that this also has the wider effect of bringing EU Common Security and Defence Policy missions as a whole into disrepute.

In terms of civilian policing, the EU has provided a unique and vital capability for the stabilisation of Afghanistan society. We welcome this, and applaud the work undertaken by EUPOL staff under such challenging conditions. The problem remains the level of that capability (paragraphs 7, 59–70, 78, 79, Box 2).

The nature of policing

The EUPOL mission is unique in Afghanistan in terms of trying to build up a civilian policing capability—a force that relates to the Afghan people as they live their difficult lives, investigates crimes and brings cases to court. The majority of US and NATO police training is about guarding installations and counter-insurgency, rather than civilian policing as we in the west would understand it. That is why the EUPOL police mission is so important to the future of Afghanistan's development.

Given the unique contribution of EUPOL in this critical area it is once again evident that the original mission should have been undertaken with a much greater level of commitment or not undertaken at all (paragraphs 51–58, 81).

Multiple European missions

Although EUPOL took over from the previous German-led police mission, the resulting level of resourcing remained inadequate and there are still a number of bi-lateral European policing missions running concurrently, such as those run by Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and Italy.

There should be a single adequately resourced European policing mission, not a plethora of multi-lateral and bi-lateral missions. We have concerns that the number of missions reduces the effectiveness of the overall effort (paragraphs 16, 17, 60, 62).

The EU and NATO—no formal relationship

In Afghanistan there is no formal agreement between the EU/EUPOL and NATO because Afghanistan is not seen as a 'Berlin Plus' operation. We were given evidence that this lack of a formal agreement prejudiced the lives of EUPOL staff in the field. This is not just inefficient; it is clearly unacceptable.

A renewed political effort to secure a formal EU/NATO agreement in Afghanistan must be made and we trust that the Government will put a major effort into taking this forward. Only the Taliban benefit from the lack of such an agreement (paragraphs 59, 65–70).

Numbers versus quality

From our evidence it is apparent that great stress is laid by the NATO-led coalition on the number of police, rather than quality (as is also true of army training). Training courses tend to be short (six weeks) and emphasise the need to meet numerical targets. While numbers are important, so also is quality; and six weeks of training is not enough. The huge rate at which trained police very quickly leave the service needs to be recognised—we heard in our evidence of a staff attrition rate, at one point, of 75%.

The drive for numbers for an Afghan police force needs to be accompanied by greater attention to the quality of training and to the high turnover of those once trained (paragraphs 20–23, 26–31, 51).

Practicalities—reading, rations and relocation

The practical difficulties facing EUPOL should not be underestimated. The situation in the Afghan police is dire. The illiteracy rate amongst police recruits is as high as 70%. Police officers who cannot read are not able to process evidence, read instructions, or write reports. There is currently no coherent strategy for reducing illiteracy in the police and literate Afghans are often for preference recruited into the Afghan army and paramilitary police forces. Paying police and ensuring that the money is not “lost” before it reaches the police on the ground has also been a great challenge. Police officers located away from their home areas tend to leave and migrate back to their own provinces.

Greater emphasis needs to be paid to the most basic of policing skills, not least reading and writing. Attention is also needed to the conditions in which police work, their general welfare and the location to which they are posted (paragraphs 24–25, 28–31, 57).

Judicial systems—getting convictions

There is limited point in civilian style policing if the judicial system itself does not work, or is not being developed simultaneously. It seems to us that a key part of EUPOL’s mission is that of coordination with the judicial system, prosecutors in particular. However, work in this area also has had very limited impact. Too often, it would seem, crimes are not prosecuted because of corruption within the judicial organisations. This undermines EUPOL’s fundamental mission of training a force capable of investigation followed by prosecution.

Any EU policing mission must be inextricably linked to the wider judicial system. Over the remainder of the mission greater attention must be paid to this link, and corruption must be attacked throughout the Afghan judicial system (paragraphs 46–50).

Command and control—the role of Brussels

We were impressed by the commitment to the success of the mission by individuals in Brussels, but there are evident flaws. Firstly, equipment procurement processes held up the start of the mission beyond reasonable timescales. We applaud the principle of competitive tendering. However, this means that all equipment for a mission, such as EUPOL, has to be purchased new through normal procurement processes. It is inappropriate for a situation such as Afghanistan and must lead to wonderment by other allies. It was also clear that too often decision-making in Brussels was not quick enough, and was at a level too detailed, for EUPOL to be effective. Although we understand a number of these issues have been resolved it remains a key area of concern.

The procurement rules for such operations, and the inability to make use of Member State equipment and assets, must be revisited. There must also be a division of decision-making between Brussels and the field that works well operationally so that Heads of Mission on the ground have enough authority to make decisions of an operational nature. In any case, when decisions are made in Brussels—as some will have to be—they should be made in a timely manner (paragraphs 77, 84–90, Box 3).

Conflicting timescales

The work that EUPOL is able to do is generally of good quality and meets real needs in terms of civilian policing. Nevertheless, although the EUPOL mission is only extended currently until May 2013, it is quite clear from all our witnesses that the job will take at least 5 to 10 years longer. Yet the deadlines for military withdrawal are 2014–15.

We find it difficult to understand how the work of EUPOL can continue and its investment in the police force be realised without a major reduction in, or cessation of, the insurgency. Clearly this depends upon what follows military withdrawal, but the omens are not—on any reasonable assessment—at all favourable.

Before any further extensions of the mission are decided, the wider security environment must be considered. There must be a question—and perhaps more than a question—whether the arrangements associated with the deadlines for military withdrawal could render EUPOL ineffective and will risk the lives of serving police officers for no future effect (paragraphs 64, 96–105).

Overall assessment

Although EUPOL is probably more challenged than any other EU civilian mission, the work it does is more valuable than that of many other multinational missions in Afghanistan. It has very dedicated staff who believe in the mission's objectives, and who also believe that they can be achieved, but over many more years. In one or two individual project areas such as 'City Policing' there have been real successes.

But the mission was too late, too slow to get off the ground once the decision was made, and too small to achieve its aim; or perhaps, worst, too small to receive respect from other actors.

This was an opportunity for Europe to pull its weight in Afghanistan in a discipline and skills area where it had great expertise. In this, despite the dedication and risks taken by those on the ground, the EU's Member States have not yet succeeded. Not only was the resource allocation of 400 staff in practice woefully inadequate for this important task, the fact that even those numbers have never been met has undermined the reputation of the mission.

As military withdrawal deadlines approach, the dedication of much more resources will be necessary if the mission is to be able to achieve its aims.

This has been a troubled mission undertaking a vital task in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Despite achieving local successes, overall there is a strong risk of failure.

The EU's Afghan Police Mission

CHAPTER 1: THE MISSION'S MANDATE

Introduction

1. The EU's Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) began in 2007, some six years after the initial US military intervention. The problems it faced were immense: a lack of security, a multiplicity of other international players, a government struggling to assert itself, a barely existent police force and justice system, illiteracy and corruption. The situation has changed very little.
2. This report examines the mandate, activities and effectiveness of the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan as well as the key challenges facing it and how to address them, including training, illiteracy, the attrition rate in the police, differing concepts of policing, international coordination and the relationship between the Mission and Brussels. Our recommendations on the way forward address a number of the problems above.
3. This report was prepared by the Sub-Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development Policy whose members are listed in Appendix 1. Those from whom we took evidence are listed in Appendix 2. We are grateful to them all.
4. **We make this report to the House for debate.**

Mission origins and composition

5. Alistair Burt MP (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) set out the origins of the EU's Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL). The 2006 Afghanistan Compact, launched at the London conference in January 2006, provided the framework for co-operation between the newly elected government of Afghanistan and the international community¹. The UK Government supported the launch of two fact-finding missions to Afghanistan in late 2006, on the basis of which a mandate for EUPOL was agreed in June 2007. This built on and broadened the efforts of an earlier German police project that had been operating since 2002². We were told by Dr Ronja Kempin (German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin) that the German Police Project Office (GPPO) had made important progress but "funds and personnel were not enough to achieve the goals that had been set". Despite German successes in training, the German approach "would have taken years to reach the goal of training 62,000 police officers". This led to the formation of EUPOL, which had a more strategic approach for building a functioning national police force and a country-wide remit³.

¹ The Compact, following the establishment of the Afghan parliament in December 2005, signalled a change in approach towards greater partnership between donors and the Afghan Government, thus emphasising Afghan ownership of the process. It called for increased donor coordination and focused on previously marginalised areas, including police and rule-of-law reform.

² Q 106

³ Appendix 3

6. EUPOL, established under Council Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP, started operations on 15 June 2007. In May 2010, the Council of the EU decided to extend its mandate for three years until 31 May 2013. The common costs of the operation, such as accommodation, communications and transport in Afghanistan, are €54.6 million for the 12 months until 31 May 2011. Individual Member States contribute the costs of deploying their secondees to the Mission⁴.
7. The original mandated strength of the mission was 200 international staff. The Minister told us that in May 2008 the EU had agreed to “work towards” the deployment of 400 staff⁵. However, the current Mission strength falls short of this at 306 international seconded and contracted staff⁶ of whom 14 are seconded from the UK which is in the process of recruiting an additional five secondees. The UK secondees are currently serving or retired policemen but in the past the UK has also seconded civilian rule of law experts⁷. The Mission consists of 168 police officers, 49 rule of law experts and 89 civilian experts, deployed as follows:
- 217 at the EUPOL Headquarters in Kabul (including five assigned to the International Police Coordinating Board, (IPCB) Secretariat);
 - 85 operating outside the capital, spread across 13 Provinces;
 - Four providing support within the Mission Support Element in Brussels.

In addition, 176 Afghan nationals assist the Mission.

Due to the high turnaround of officers on the ground, exact staff numbers are fluid, with numbers in the high 200s being typical⁸. But currently the following seconded personnel have been provided to EUPOL from 22 EU Member States plus Canada, Croatia, New Zealand and Norway (figures for 29 November 2010, see Table 1 below).

TABLE 1

Number of seconded staff by participating country (see footnote 4)

Country	No. of Secondees	Country	No. of Secondees
Finland	37	Austria	5
Germany	36	Belgium	4
Netherlands	23	Estonia	4
Sweden	19	Lithuania	4
Denmark	15	Czech Republic	3
UK	14	New Zealand	3

⁴ All the costs of contracted staff are paid from the CFSP budget (part of Heading 4 of the EU budget). The CFSP budget covers the costs of a daily allowance for seconded staff as well as costs while they are deployed (headquarters, administration, communication). Member States pay the salaries of their seconded staff, the costs of pre-deployment training, personal and medical insurance, equipment and travel costs to and from deployment.

⁵ Q 106

⁶ Figures provided by the FCO, correct as at 29 November 2010.

⁷ Information provided by the FCO.

⁸ Q 68

Italy	13	Poland	3
Norway	11	Spain	3
Romania	11	Latvia	2
France	8	Slovakia	2
Hungary	8	Bulgaria	1
Ireland	8	Croatia	1
Canada	7	Greece	1
Total number of seconded staff: 246			
An additional 60 international contracted staff make up the mission			

8. EUPOL is deployed at central (Kabul), regional and provincial levels, through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) (see Box 1 below). The UK has EUPOL personnel in two areas: 10 in Kabul and four in Helmand.
9. On 15 July 2010 Brigadier General Jukka Savolainen, formerly a senior official in the Finnish Ministry of the Interior, took over as Head of Mission. EUPOL has recently agreed a Status of Mission Agreement with the Afghan Government, which provides a firm legal footing for EUPOL in Afghanistan, as well as setting out privileges and immunities for EUPOL personnel⁹. Unlike the EU's rule of law Mission in Kosovo, EUPOL does not have executive powers, such as the power of arrest and detention.

Mandate and strategic objectives

10. EUPOL's objective is to:

“contribute to the establishment under Afghan ownership of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements, which will ensure appropriate interaction with the wider criminal justice system, in keeping with the policy advice and institution-building work of the Union, Member States and other international actors. Furthermore, the Mission will support the reform process towards a trusted and efficient police service, which works in accordance with international standards, within the framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights.”¹⁰
11. The Mission's tasks are¹¹:
 - to assist the Government of Afghanistan in coherently implementing its strategy towards sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements, especially with regard to the Afghan Uniformed Civilian Police and the Afghan Anti-Crime Police, as stipulated in the National Police Strategy;
 - to improve cohesion and coordination among international actors;
 - to work on strategy development, while placing an emphasis on work towards a joint overall strategy of the international community in police reform and to enhance cooperation with key partners in police reform and

⁹ APM 1–3

¹⁰ Council Decision 2010/279/CFSP, Article 2, 18 May 2010.

¹¹ Council Decision 2010/279/CFSP, Article 3, 18 May 2010.

training, including with NATO-led mission ISAF and the NATO Training Mission and other contributors;

- to support linkages between the police and the wider rule of law.
12. Our request to the FCO for access to EUPOL operational documents was refused because they are classified as “EU Restricted”, but an EU fact sheet on EUPOL outlines the six strategic priorities which the Mission agreed in June 2009 for operational purposes:
 - (i) Develop police command, control and communications for the Ministry of Interior and the Afghan National Police;
 - (ii) Develop intelligence-led policing;
 - (iii) Build the capabilities of the Criminal Investigations Department;
 - (iv) Develop anti-corruption capacities;
 - (v) Improve cooperation and coordination between the police and the judiciary, with a particular emphasis on prosecutors;
 - (vi) Mainstream gender issues and human rights within the Ministry of Interior and the Afghan National Police.
 13. The EU implements these priorities by advising and mentoring the Ministry of the Interior on overall police strategy; undertaking projects such as the City Policing and Justice Project; and by organising training courses for senior and mid-ranking Afghan police officers. EUPOL also plays a key role in advising senior Afghan police officers, including Provincial Chiefs of Police. EUPOL is in contact with the Provincial Chiefs of Police in all provinces where there is a EUPOL presence, though the nature of EUPOL’s role in each varies. In addition to Kabul, EUPOL is currently present in 12 out of the 27 provinces: Bamyan, Chackcharan, Faizabad, Herat, Kandahar, Mazar e Sharif, Pol e Alam, Kunduz, Helmand, Maymanah, Pol e Kumri and Tarankot¹².

¹² See map at Appendix 5

CHAPTER 2: THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

The security and development context

14. The subject of this report is the EU's police mission. However, it is not the EU's sole contribution to restoring Afghanistan; see Box 1 below. In this chapter we consider the challenging environment in which the mission operates.
15. Our witnesses commented that the building of the police and justice sector formed part of the overall security and development efforts in Afghanistan. Problems in the latter necessarily affected the former. As Kees Klompenhouwer (EU Civilian Operation Commander) remarked: "the absence of a peace settlement is already a complicating factor in implementing our mandate"¹³. Fatima Ayub (Open Society Foundation) argued that there were competing and incoherent visions of development in Afghanistan. Donors were spending aid bilaterally on projects and through channels of their choice, rather than the Afghan government taking the lead. Furthermore, all this was "unfolding in a battlefield"¹⁴.

BOX 1

EU Support for Afghanistan

Over the period 2002–2010 the EU collectively and its Member States individually have together contributed around €8 billion in aid to Afghanistan, including for the Afghan National Police, justice sector reform and border management. Approximately 30 % of EU aid provided between 2002 and June 2009 has been channelled through multi-donor trust funds that provide a substantial part of the Afghan government's core budget. Overall, the EU has contributed €545 million to trust funds. The EU is the single largest contributor to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) which pays for the running costs of the Afghan National Police. The EU Delegation has provided some €225 million to the Trust Fund to date.

The EU has played an active role in supporting counter-narcotics efforts, including the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund to which it contributed €15 million. The EU has provided €20.5 million to the Project for Alternative Livelihoods implemented by the German office for technical cooperation (GTZ). EU Member States are actively involved in the field of rural development which is critical for the provision of sustainable alternative livelihoods for farmers involved in opium poppy cultivation.

European involvement also takes the form of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, run by individual nations as part of NATO's presence in Afghanistan. There are 27 PRTs of which some 7 are led by an EU Member State¹⁵.

¹³ Q 164

¹⁴ Q 3

¹⁵ HC Defence Committee evidence, OPA 07, 30 September 2010, <http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-archive/defence-committee/>

Training and mentoring the Afghan National Police (ANP)

16. Since 2001, there have been a number of international missions aimed at supporting policing in Afghanistan. They include EUPOL, NATO, the UN, the US, national bilateral missions and private contractors. Over time, the NATO Training Mission (NTM-A) and the EU Police Mission have developed, and a number of bilateral missions have been subsumed into these multilateral missions. Remaining bilateral missions are also strongly encouraged to coordinate their work with the multilateral missions, primarily the NTM-A and EUPOL, as well as with the Afghan Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible for the police. As a result, the lines between bilateral and multilateral contributions are not always easily distinguishable. For example, the UK leads on the Helmand Police Training Centre, but it also involves Denmark and the US, and the Centre will be transferred to NTM-A command in 2011.
17. Bilateral police missions by EU Member States are run by Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Denmark. The German Police Project Team (GPPT), with over 200 staff, makes a significant contribution, delivering police training at all levels. The GPPT works in close coordination with EUPOL and NTM-A in Kabul and northern Afghanistan, with training sites in Mazar-e-Sharif, Kunduz and Feyazabad. It also delivers training for officers and senior NCOs at the Afghan National Police Academy in Kabul.

BOX 2

International Police Training Missions in Afghanistan, including the NATO Mission (NTM-A)

The largest police training operation in Afghanistan is conducted by the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). The US Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), previously the most significant bilateral police training mission, was brought under the command of NTM-A in 2009.

NATO's mandate includes the training and development of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) via the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A). This is by far the largest training mission in Afghanistan, with an annual budget of US\$9.5 billion. The British Embassy in Kabul advise that NTM-A spends approximately US\$3.5 billion a year of this sum on ANP development. This spend is likely to increase each year, as the mission takes on responsibility for bilateral projects.

NTM-A's training curriculum is designed mainly by military officers or military police with input from civilian advisers. The curriculum is delivered through a mixture of contracted (retired) civilian police officers, police officers or military officers. The "Basic Six" (six week) training programme provides basic training for frontline policing on which EUPOL can build. The basic training in some instances, for example at the Helmand Police Training Centre, includes modules on the laws of Afghanistan, the role and ethics of police in society and human rights¹⁶.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) provides some training for the ANP, specifically on human rights, and mentoring for ANP and Ministry of Interior officials on building capacity in payroll and

¹⁶ Information provided by the FCO.

human resources functions. The UN also has police advisers in its offices in different areas of Afghanistan and the UN Development Program runs a project in Kabul Province developing community policing within the ANP. This is tightly coordinated with the work of NTM-A and EUPOL.

Several individual non-EU nations provide direct bilateral support to special units in the Afghan policing system, such as those responsible for counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics. For example, Canada provides 48 civilian and 40 military police trainers and mentors supporting ANP reform across Afghanistan. The military trainers focus on security and the civilian police focus on criminal investigation and leadership. They are based at the Kandahar Provisional Reconstruction Team where they have a certified police training academy. Canada delivers a programme called Kandahar Model Police Project, with Canadian police embedded in district police stations and accompanying ANP foot patrols. Turkey has established a bilateral training project in Jowzjan focusing on counter-narcotics training, in addition to basic ANP training. It also works with NTM-A to design and deliver an officer training course¹⁷.

The Afghan National Police (ANP)

18. There are four main elements to the 96,000-strong Afghan National Police. A degree of flexibility exists in their remits and the way in which they are deployed:
 - The Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) and the Afghan Border Police, who are undergoing training as paramilitary police, for counter-insurgency operations. EUPOL is not involved directly in training these forces as it is not its area of expertise.
 - The Afghan Uniformed Civilian Police and the Afghan Anti-Crime Police who undertake criminal investigations. EUPOL has taken the lead on training and mentoring these two elements.
 - In addition, a local auxiliary force with a guard role, constitutes a fifth element (see paragraphs 38–42 below).

Police traditions

19. We asked our witnesses whether there had been a tradition of policing in Afghanistan. Fatima Ayub commented that between World War 2 and the Soviet invasion in 1979 there had been a civil order police in the gendarmerie tradition¹⁸. Karen Pierce (UK Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, FCO) told us that in the past the police had been used more as an instrument of the local warlord than as a manifestation of the authority of the state. For that reason, there was still “a fair bit of corruption in certain provinces” and the people did not trust the police¹⁹. Dr Kempin told us that the GPPO had repaired civilian structures that had been “almost completely wiped out under the mujahedin and the Taliban.” Traditional ranks in the ANP had been slimmed down to create a homogenous leadership structure and leading posts had been filled according to professional criteria.

¹⁷ APM 7

¹⁸ Q 15

¹⁹ Q 110

Arrangements had been made to ensure that police were paid regularly and a police academy set up in Kabul for mid- and high-ranking officers²⁰.

The problems

20. The Minister recognised that “we are working from a very low base in a variety of different institutions across Afghanistan”, but he highlighted the “extraordinary commitment that people are making in order to produce the change, which is absolutely vital”. The United Kingdom’s objective was not based on military conquest but on making the country secure. Progress was being made and the UK was working to strengthen police vetting procedures. The new Afghan Minister of the Interior had made a positive start towards achieving six key objectives seeking to tackle the most pressing issues affecting police reform: training; leadership; fighting corruption; reforming structure; equipment and living conditions; and punishment and reward. Efforts were being made to tackle the issues, both at ministry level and through the EU’s work²¹.
21. Chief Superintendent Nigel Thomas (former member of the EUPOL mission and interim Head of Mission from May to July 2010) told us that many people within the police wanted to serve the community. However, the police suffered from numerous and serious problems including a high attrition rate, illiteracy and corruption. They lacked the capability to conduct the most basic community policing tasks, including forensic science and investigation techniques using intelligence and information. Moreover, the police were resented by the public. The police did not interface with the public and generally did not conduct patrols. They were trained to maintain security, including manning checkpoints and installations and acting as a static guard force, rather than a police force accessible to the public who would investigate crimes and undertake basic and fundamental policing. There was a “complete lack of investigation of crimes”²².
22. Dr Kempin described the parlous state of the police when EUPOL was formed: country police stations in a desolate state with widespread shortages of modern firearms, munitions, vehicles, fuel and communication systems; police so poorly paid that they had been unable to feed their families, making many prone to corruption or entanglement in criminal activities, such as charging arbitrary “taxes” at checkpoints. Accusations of torture and other human rights violations had undermined the integrity of the force, as had arrangements allowing suspects to buy their way out of custody. Lack of central attention to police experience or training, leading to lawlessness and trade in police posts, and Interior Ministry officials involved in the drugs trade misusing their power contributed further to the problems²³. Kees Klompenhouwer told us “the situation of the Afghan police is dire”²⁴.
23. We found that a further problem was the lack of an experienced middle-ranking level of leadership in the Afghan police. The Minister acknowledged that experience could not be invented. It was not possible suddenly to have “officers who are native to Afghanistan with 20 years’ civilian background

²⁰ Appendix 3

²¹ Q 110

²² QQ 50–52, 57

²³ Appendix 3

²⁴ Q 140

experience.” Finding the leaders for the future was as important as ensuring that basic front-line officers had the skills they needed to do the job. Mentoring played an important role in finding potential leaders. Karen Pierce added that the training programmes allowed for the police equivalent of an army non-commissioned officer, as well as that of army officers. However, it was very difficult to get qualified personnel to fill these positions²⁵.

Illiteracy, drug-taking and human rights

24. Literacy is a prime requirement for civilian policing in order to take down evidence, keep proper records, read a map or a number plate or the serial number of a gun. Fatima Ayub underlined the challenges posed when trying to ensure police could interview witnesses and document what they found²⁶. Nigel Thomas told us that the illiteracy rate in the police of around 70% was a major obstacle to developing a community policing system in Afghanistan. The military were taking all the best and literate officers into ANCOP and the border police, leaving all the illiterate officers for the uniform police and the Criminal Investigation Department. There was no effective education strategy for the ANP that he was aware of.²⁷ It was essential that the development of a civilian police force should be supported by other non-governmental organisation activity to improve literacy skills. Drug-taking was also a problem; but it fluctuated throughout the country, and an American survey had suggested that the level was not as high as anticipated²⁸.
25. **The lack of literacy in the Afghan police is a fundamental problem hindering its development. The EU, the Afghan government and international players should make a major investment in the literacy of police officers and new recruits. This will enable them better to pursue community policing, including criminal investigations, and is the most tractable of the issues surveyed here. So far there has been insufficient focus on literacy in the Afghan police and we call on the Government and the EU to increase funding and other support for this crucial area.**
26. We asked witnesses specifically about the attitude to and use of torture. Nigel Thomas told us that it had been part of the culture of Afghan society in the recent past, though he had been surprised at the engagement and interest of the Afghan police in human rights. He had seen reports of abuses from around the country but EUPOL was working with the Afghan police to ensure that any abuses were investigated and dealt with, which had been part of his role in advising the Minister of the Interior. EUPOL was developing human rights structures in the ANP which were acceptable to Afghanistan²⁹.
27. **We support EUPOL’s mandate to mainstream human rights in its work and urge EUPOL to continue to support the Afghan Ministry of the Interior’s efforts to eliminate torture from the system and to investigate allegations of abuses.**

²⁵ Q 113

²⁶ Q 16

²⁷ QQ 60, 61

²⁸ QQ 58, 86

²⁹ QQ 96–97

Attrition rate

28. Nigel Thomas told us that the high attrition rate in the police was a major problem. On paper, the strength of the ANP was 96,000. The target had been to reach 111,000 by October 2010 and 134,000 by October 2011. However, reaching these targets was “very difficult”, given that, at one point an attrition rate of 75% had been reached. The reasons for this were varied but included the high mortality and injury rate, the lack of leave, welfare or shift patterns, and cultural factors such as deployment far from families in a country where family was particularly important. Tajiks in the north, who had expected to be policing their own community, tended to depart if they found themselves posted to Marjah and operating in the Pashtun heartlands. A policeman could be expected to remain at a checkpoint for a week, having travelled over a dangerous road to reach it. In Mr Thomas’s opinion shift patterns, leave and welfare support should be developed to mitigate this problem³⁰.
29. Fatima Ayub spoke of the physical dangers confronting the police. Afghans saw clearly that the police were the front line against the insurgency and were dying at a much faster rate than army or coalition forces. This in part accounted for the attrition rate, as people were reluctant to expose themselves to such risks³¹.
30. We were told by Nigel Thomas that pay was now less of a problem than it had been in the past. Rates for a basic ANCOP patrolman had increased from US\$80 a month in 2008 to around \$220 a month for ANCOP in more dangerous areas. (The annual Afghan GDP per capita in 2008 was US\$466³².) However, actual pay to police on the ground was often less than the nominal sum, and funds intended for the three meals a day in the package were often also skimmed away. Some action had been taken to reduce corruption: an American system of payment by crediting bank accounts through mobile phones had been a “massively positive step forward” enabling the police to gain access to their money, though there were associated problems since not everyone had a bank account and there had been instances where the Chief of Police had taken the SIM cards and collected the salaries from the bank³³.
31. The attrition rate is an extremely serious problem for the Afghan police and poses a major challenge to EUPOL’s effort to deliver sustainable improvements. We salute the courage of the Afghan police who are often the first target for insurgents. **EUPOL should urge the Afghan Ministry of the Interior to pay greater attention to the causes of the attrition rate in the police, including high mortality and injury, the lack of leave, welfare or shift patterns, and cultural factors such as deployment far from families and home territory. This should also be built into EUPOL’s own strategy.**

Corruption, organised crime, infiltration

32. Corruption is a pervasive problem in the Afghan National Police, as in other aspects of the current Afghan society, with money being skimmed off at all levels. Fatima Ayub said that petty corruption included the payment of

³⁰ QQ 57, 59, 62

³¹ Q 40

³² Source UN data for 2008, <http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx>

³³ QQ 59, 62, 80, 81

bribes to the police to investigate a crime or issue a permit. She pointed out that the police were the public face of the government in remote districts and were consequently important to the reputation of the government itself³⁴.

33. Nigel Thomas commented that “from the top to the bottom of the organisation, corruption is a problem.” At the top corruption was linked to organised crime; at the lowest level, money was extorted from the public at checkpoints. The weakness of the legal system was a further difficulty in combating corruption³⁵. Bribery and corruption connected to the narcotics trade were inevitable and it was known that certain police chiefs had been implicated³⁶.
34. However, EUPOL was heavily involved in the development of an emerging anti-corruption strategy. The Inspector-General’s Department within the Ministry of the Interior had been set up as part of this. It had established covert anti-corruption teams with support from EUPOL, the US-led coalition (CSTC-A) and the UK to start investigating and arresting the perpetrators. “It’s a big, long challenge, but you have to start somewhere”³⁷.
35. We asked our witnesses about infiltration of the police by the Taliban or Al Qaeda. Fatima Ayub thought that the prime concern should be the need to ensure quality in policing, rather than the lesser concern of infiltration by the Taliban. There was anecdotal evidence of individuals being police by day and Taliban by night, but this raised again the broader problem of not being able to ensure the background and professionalism of recruits. An effort had been made to institute a vetting process for chiefs of police and police officers at district levels but it had become highly politicised and had been unsuccessful³⁸.
36. Nigel Thomas thought it was inevitable that there would be sleepers in the force because of the easy access into an organisation desperate for recruits. He cited three incidents when western soldiers had been killed by police in an organisation of almost 100,000³⁹. Rooting out sleepers was a challenge as it was very difficult to carry out any meaningful vetting process⁴⁰.
37. Corruption continues to permeate the Afghan National Police at all levels, despite the efforts of the Afghan Ministry of the Interior and the international community to eradicate it. **We urge the EU to redouble its efforts to combat corruption in the police, without which the rule of law will be impossible and the Afghan government’s reputation with the people will be further damaged. Establishing a robust financial management system, including an effective chain of payments to ensure that police officers are paid in full and on time, should be a priority, since a well-paid officer is less likely to take a bribe.**

The local auxiliary police

38. Karen Pierce told us that there had been a debate within the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) about the benefits and risks of setting up a

³⁴ QQ 5, 6

³⁵ Q 52

³⁶ Q 84

³⁷ Q 52

³⁸ QQ 16–20

³⁹ Since this evidence was given, there have been reports that 6 Americans were shot by Afghan policemen in December 2010, with further incidents in January 2011.

⁴⁰ Q 83–84

local auxiliary police. In the end ISAF, the international community and the Afghan government had decided that the “balance of advantage” lay in setting up such a force. This was partly to provide jobs for former insurgents—low-level fighters earning \$10 a day—and to provide a community home for them; and partly because of the lack of capacity of the Afghan National Police. These forces would come under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior and were answerable to the district police chiefs. Ms Pierce sought to assure us that the auxiliary police were not in a position where they could be suborned by the local warlords. The plan was to build up the local police to around 10,000 personnel. It was envisaged that this force might last for two to five years, depending on the growth rate of the national police⁴¹.

39. Kees Klompenhouwer was cautious in his assessment of the auxiliary police force: “it is very much in the hands of our American friends” and outside the scope of EUPOL’s mandate. Command and control were the obvious issues which would need to be addressed, and were the responsibility the Minister of the Interior; arrangements were in place for vetting and coaching this force. The professional policemen in EUPOL were concerned that the new recruits should act in accordance with “certain standards”⁴².
40. Nigel Thomas described the function of the auxiliary police as akin to a guard and security function, aimed initially at relieving the ANP from guard duties. He did not feel that EUPOL should engage in it and “... as a civilian police officer, I would want to distance myself from it”. There were both benefits and potential pitfalls in arming a significant number of people across the country and it would have to be robustly managed⁴³.
41. Fatima Ayub expressed strong opposition to the establishment of the auxiliary police. Thousands of people were involved and had been threatening voters during parliamentary elections. “If the EU wants to challenge something more vocally in that respect, I am sure that it would be welcome. Afghans are terrified because these militia operate with no accountability to anyone.” The Americans had started the programme but it was being expanded across the country. Funds came from the PRTs. “I cannot stress enough that this is a very destructive trend ... competing with the legitimate forces and institutions ...”⁴⁴
42. We are concerned about the creation of the local auxiliary police in Afghanistan, which aims to fulfil a guard role. This poses a serious risk that armed groups outside formal structures could challenge the authority of the state, collude with local warlords, use their firearms improperly, instil fear in the population, and engage in corruption or the drug trade. The inadequacy of management structures and discipline in the auxiliary police are also worrying. **The EU should take up with the Afghan Ministry of the Interior and the Americans the potential threat to stability in Afghanistan which will be posed by the newly created auxiliary police if effective command and control are not exercised by the Afghan Ministry of the Interior.**

⁴¹ Q 127

⁴² Q 163

⁴³ QQ 88–90

⁴⁴ QQ 38–39

Women and gender issues

43. EUPOL's priority number six is to "mainstream gender and human rights aspects within the Ministry of Interior and the Afghan National Police", (see paragraph 12). Fatima Ayub told us that NTM-A and EUPOL were both aware of the need to train women police, for more reasons than just gender balance. Where there were gender-specific crimes such as domestic violence and rape in Afghanistan, women would probably be needed to investigate them. The NTM-A training programme had recently graduated the first set of women police lieutenants⁴⁵.
44. Nigel Thomas told us that EUPOL was developing a training centre for women officers in Bamyan. The build programme and curriculum development would take 18 months. After this, EUPOL would have to bring in trainers, train them and work on Afghan ownership of the project⁴⁶.
45. **EUPOL is right to include as a priority the training of women in its programme to mainstream gender issues and human rights within the Ministry of the Interior and the Afghan National Police, and we welcome the establishment of a training centre for women police officers in Bamyan.**

Building police links with the judiciary

46. EUPOL's role includes improving "cooperation and coordination between the police and the judiciary with particular emphasis on prosecutors" (5th priority, see paragraph 12). The Minister described the work as: "first, developing the investigative capacity of the ANP to facilitate better trials; secondly, mentoring the Minister of the Interior and his legal adviser and working with and mentoring some Afghan prosecutors; thirdly, running courses for the Attorney-General's staff; fourthly, working with the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) and the police to advance human rights issues." Other projects included setting up a legal library in Herat and a full reference library and archive for the MoI in Kabul. Mobile anti-corruption teams had also been set up⁴⁷.
47. Fatima Ayub criticised the failings in justice sector reform: "the most neglected area of the international effort from 2002 onwards". She believed that the same neglect applied to the EU's attitude to the justice sector⁴⁸. She commented that the critical failure for EUPOL, and for security sector reform as a whole, was that they had been unable to look at the problem holistically: "you can train the best police in the world but it will not matter if you do not have a judiciary that can prosecute crimes" or "if they cannot actually arrest high-level government officials for crimes ... or for corruption"⁴⁹.
48. Kees Klompenhouwer told us that a justice strategy was in place, but while EUPOL was co-operating with part of the criminal justice system, it had no ownership of it. Training had been given on standard operating procedures

⁴⁵ Q 45

⁴⁶ Q 74

⁴⁷ Q 123

⁴⁸ Q 28

⁴⁹ Q 27

which were to be applied by police and prosecutors investigating a case⁵⁰. Nigel Thomas said that corruption was widespread, in particular because prosecutors were only paid US \$50 per month. He also commented that the judiciary was a problematic area but was improving⁵¹.

49. Beyond EUPOL's mandate, the EU collectively and Member States individually have made a significant contribution to the justice sector and furthering the rule of law in Afghanistan (see Box 1 above). Karen Pierce told us that in the south the UK funded what were called "traditional justice programmes" in an attempt to introduce an element of dispute mediation so that local communities did not have to rely on the Taliban for this. Others funded these programmes elsewhere in Helmand. However, the clarity and speed of Taliban decisions held certain attractions for Afghans who did not want to wait for government decisions, which could be fairer, but took time. This was an ongoing problem⁵².
50. The Afghan judiciary has received insufficient attention from the EU and the international community since 2001. Determined efforts are needed to build capacity and eliminate corruption in the judiciary, without which progress on police reform risks being unproductive. **EUPOL should continue to work with the Ministry of the Interior to ensure that those arrested can be properly brought to trial. A greater effort must also be made to tackle corruption in the Ministry of Justice.**

⁵⁰ QQ 139, 160

⁵¹ Q 67

⁵² Q 124

CHAPTER 3: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND THE ROLE OF THE POLICE

Different perceptions of policing

51. The evidence we heard highlighted a problem of differing perceptions of the role of the police by different actors and hence a difference in the purpose of training. We were told that the US and NATO's prime concern was rapidly to build an anti-insurgency force where numbers and speed were important, using a basic six-week NTM-A training course (which mainly covered the use of firearms). EUPOL on the other hand aimed to form a force which would undertake a traditional policing role over the longer term. As Nigel Thomas put it, "if you are going to develop an organisation ... you can't just run [the recruits] through the six week training programme". The basic police training had been shrunk from eight weeks to six. Eight weeks was deemed to be too long because it was taking too long to get the police onto the ground. "Anybody who has a police training background would know that six weeks is not sufficient to train a police officer". EUPOL's long-term development programme was incompatible with the military imperative of getting "feet on the ground"⁵³.
52. Dr Ronja Kempin confirmed that US-trained paramilitary personnel were needed in many areas of the country for counter-insurgency operations. However, it could not be in the interests of EUPOL's objectives that the majority of Afghan police officers were trained by military officers who had no policing background. She attributed the problems to the failure by EUPOL to earn the support of the US government. This prevented it from developing a comprehensive training strategy encompassing the Afghan border police, uniformed patrols and criminal investigators⁵⁴.
53. Fatima Ayub agreed that the NATO-led coalition was essentially building up the police as a counter-insurgency force, "as the US forces put it, putting boots on the ground, such that you have someone in the line of fire against the insurgents" instead of training recruits to protect the population and uphold the rule of law, which should be the purpose of the police. This was the "core of the problem". She recommended reform of the civil service structure for the police, including recruitment, promotion and pay scales. It was important to put in place mechanisms for accountability and quality control within the Ministry of Interior. The "nominal idea" was that EUPOL, due to its presence in the provinces, would be able to extend the basic NTM-A six week training of new recruits, through advice and mentoring. In her view this was "not working out tremendously well"⁵⁵.
54. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office told us that initially a force had been needed to complement the task of the army in maintaining security. "Of necessity, that had to be a force that was less related to our concept of civilian policing and perhaps kept order more by force of arms than by anything else". Within the military strategy of "clear, hold and build", there were specific roles for the Afghan police coming in after the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Afghan National Army. However,

⁵³ QQ 56, 74

⁵⁴ Appendix 3

⁵⁵ QQ 3, 16

this approach had to change towards the development of a civilian policing structure that gathered its intelligence locally and, crucially, secured people's confidence⁵⁶.

55. Chief Superintendent Nigel Thomas also told us that EUPOL's role had developed over time. It had had some "very difficult" times to begin with resulting in initial uncertainty about EUPOL's core mandate. However, more recently the Mission's role in developing Afghanistan's capacity to conduct civilian policing had been clarified (see paragraph 12). He thought that civilian policing was achievable in some parts of the country, but elsewhere the police were fighting a war and were in some cases being deployed alongside the coalition forces because the Afghan National Army was not available. "The danger is that things get implemented piecemeal based on personal relationships and operating in certain locations, rather than an overarching strategy"⁵⁷.
56. Nigel Thomas said it was now important to ensure that EUPOL's mandate was fully understood by other actors in Afghanistan⁵⁸. Co-operation between the police and the army was still a "difficult problem". The Afghan Minister of the Interior had tried to ensure that the Afghan Ministry of Defence took responsibility for certain security issues but in the end the police were always brought into inappropriate tasks. He stressed that it was important to have a "clear, defined role for the military and the police with an understanding of ... timescales and agreement at that top strategic level"⁵⁹. Kees Klompenhouwer added that, as a junior player, the EU was subject to pressure to do things other than those which were mandated, such as involvement in basic training for which the Mission was not well equipped⁶⁰.
57. EUPOL's mandate focuses on civilian police training at the strategic level while NATO provides large-scale but basic counter-insurgency training to the police. However, these roles are frequently confused and this lack of clarity detracts from the effectiveness of the Afghan National Police. **The EU should work through EUPOL to ensure that police training focuses on the civilian policing role of resolving crimes, maintaining contact with the local population and upholding the rule of law. EU representatives should persuade the Afghan government that it is in their own interests for the police to be allowed to focus on good civilian police training, at least in areas where there is sufficient security for them to operate, since the police are the face of the government in the majority of the country.**
58. **Fighting the insurgency should primarily be the responsibility of NATO forces and, increasingly, the Afghan National Army. However, because coordination between the Afghan police and army is a difficult problem, the police are being left to fight the Taliban in some areas and community policing is being neglected. The EU must seek the cooperation of the Afghan Ministry of Defence, NATO and the US to prevent the police being used as a substitute for the Afghan army in the counter-insurgency struggle.**

⁵⁶ Q 111

⁵⁷ Q 63

⁵⁸ QQ 49, 101

⁵⁹ QQ 77, 87

⁶⁰ QQ 16, 64, 149

EUPOL's relations with other actors

59. The proliferation of international actors has caused some difficulties for EUPOL. Nigel Thomas commented that his first two months in Afghanistan were spent “trying to deal with this international partner issue rather than getting on with my day job of mentoring the Minister.” The lack of a formal dialogue with NATO was also a hindrance⁶¹.
60. Fatima Ayub said that EU Member States ran bilateral police training, in addition to EUPOL and the multinational mission led by the US and NATO⁶². She was critical of the fact that at any one time since 2002 there had been at least two competing tracks of police training⁶³. Kees Klompenhouwer told us that the bilateral police projects of some Member States were either integrated with the national military posture or with a NATO or American operation. Integration was needed at the top and his key objective was “to turn a complicated situation into one where we can find mutual understanding and support.” However, it was difficult for EUPOL, a latecomer in Afghanistan, to turn the clock back as they had not started with a blank page⁶⁴.
61. The EU's involvement in assisting the establishment of the police and justice sector came some years after the initial western military intervention in 2001. **The lesson to be learnt for the EU and the international community is that, in any future intervention in failing or failed states, a strategy for early civilian involvement is essential in building effective police and justice systems. If the EU decides that it wants to make a serious contribution to solving civilian and police matters, it should ensure that such missions are at a level that has a significant effect on outcomes.**
62. **We understand the problems of integrating with operations run bilaterally by EU Member States before EUPOL was created. However, we believe that EUPOL's impact would be increased if the bilateral operations were to be incorporated into the EU's joint effort. There should be a single adequately resourced European policing mission, rather than a plethora of multi-lateral and bi-lateral missions. The EU should continue to create a more unified European approach to police reform, by integrating the separate Member State bilateral operations into EUPOL where possible.**
63. In order to tackle the problems of coordination, an International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) was established in 2007, chaired by the Minister of the Interior with EUPOL. The IPCB coordinates the support of international actors for Afghan police reform⁶⁵. The Afghan Minister of the Interior has recently agreed that EUPOL should coordinate the development of two pillars of the Afghan National Police, namely the Civilian Police and the Anti-crime Police⁶⁶.

⁶¹ QQ 64–66

⁶² NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) / Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A).

⁶³ Q 3

⁶⁴ Q 171

⁶⁵ The United States has recently set up a new, smaller body, the Ministerial Implementation Committee (MIC), mainly to coordinate the 15 different operational US agencies in Afghanistan, on which the EU is also represented.

⁶⁶ QQ 154, 155

64. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office said that the work of EUPOL, the US and NATO were “complementary, not in conflict”. Kees Klompenhouwer underlined EUPOL’s close coordination with NATO. While each organisation had different capabilities, they both sought to take a united approach to police training and reform⁶⁷. NATO valued the contribution of EUPOL to building up civilian policing, but it was not clear how EUPOL should be integrated into the wider picture, especially as the timescales⁶⁸ for the military and civilian strategies were incompatible⁶⁹.

Cooperation with NATO on the security of EUPOL personnel

65. We understand from the FCO that so far there have been no casualties in the EUPOL mission; that the Terms and Conditions of mission contracts include evacuation and insurance cover; and that pre-deployment briefing for secondees, who are volunteers, addresses issues such as living, working and moving around in country, and the overall security situation. The *per diem* allowances for staff in missions have an element reflecting risk and hardship. A review was held in early 2009 which led to staff in Afghanistan being paid a higher risk allowance.
66. However, members of the mission do run risks in performing their tasks and we heard that the lack of a formal relationship between the EU and NATO caused problems for EUPOL. Kees Klompenhouwer told us that there was no formal cooperation agreement between the NATO forces in Afghanistan and EUPOL on the security of EUPOL personnel. At present there was only a very limited agreement in place covering NATO assistance to EUPOL in case of an emergency. In addition EUPOL participated in the “blue tracking system” which allows NATO aircraft to identify EUPOL vehicles on the ground to prevent friendly-fire incidents, but this was also narrow in scope. He believed that the lack of a formal NATO/EU agreement on security “constitutes an additional risk”⁷⁰.
67. Ronja Kempin also said that, before EUPOL staff came under the shield of a PRT (see Box 1), the EU and the respective lead nation had to conclude a bilateral technical agreement. In the south and east, this was blocked by Turkey which refused to agree to any deepening of the EU-NATO relationship beyond the Berlin Plus agreement⁷¹ until the Cyprus question was resolved. This made it impossible to conclude a general agreement between the EU and NATO/ISAF on the protection of EUPOL staff. There was also a problem with the refusal by the US military to protect the members of the EU mission⁷². The Government told us that they did not consider the lack of a broad formal agreement between NATO forces in Afghanistan and EUPOL was putting the lives of EUPOL personnel at greater risk. EUPOL’s own life support arrangements, including protection from Private Security firms, fully met the UK Duty of Care standards and those of the EU Council Security Office. EUPOL did not rely in any way on military support for protection⁷³.

⁶⁷ QQ 111, 172

⁶⁸ EUPOL’s mandate has currently been extended until 2013; ISAF is due to pull out by 2015.

⁶⁹ Q 74

⁷⁰ QQ 156–9

⁷¹ The 2002 Berlin Plus Agreement stated that NATO would make available to the EU its collective assets and capabilities when needed. This agreement is not applicable in the case of EUPOL Afghanistan.

⁷² Appendix 3

⁷³ APM 3–6

68. We have since been told by EUPOL that in practice the overall working relationship between EUPOL and NATO is improving. The Europe Minister in a letter on 10 January⁷⁴ told us that ISAF has approved a revised version of its Operation Plan, with new language on security support to non-NATO actors which allows ISAF forces to go beyond limited support *in extremis* and to carry out deliberate planning and operations in support of EUPOL activity.
69. **Despite this new evidence, we still believe that the lack of a formal cooperation agreement between the NATO forces in Afghanistan and EUPOL on the security of EUPOL personnel has increased the risk to the lives of EUPOL personnel, including British citizens. This is unacceptable. A renewed political effort to secure a formal EU-NATO agreement in Afghanistan must be made. Only the Taliban benefit from the lack of such an agreement. The Government should continue to raise this at the highest level within the EU and NATO. For the same reasons, the Government should also continue to make strong representations to EU and NATO representatives in Afghanistan about the need to ensure safeguards to personnel on the ground.**

The Afghan government decree on private security contractors

70. More recently a further problem has been created by the Afghan government's August 2010 decree banning Private Security Contractors (PSCs)⁷⁵. Kees Klompenhouwer (EU Civilian Operations Commander) expressed his concern that the decree could have a detrimental impact on EUPOL's ability to operate securely. The situation particularly affected Kabul, where a PSC was employed to protect EUPOL's compound and provide protection for VIPs and unarmed EUPOL personnel. In the provinces the decree would have an indirect impact because security for EUPOL was provided by the PRT lead nation. The EU, NATO and the US were seeking a waiver from the decree for their operations⁷⁶.
71. The Afghan government's decree banning the operations of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan will seriously damage EUPOL's ability to operate securely, especially in Kabul. **We urge the Government and the EU to continue their efforts to obtain a waiver under the decree on banning the use of private security contractors. If this does not prove possible they should urgently seek alternative security arrangements, in close consultation with NATO and the US, using protection from the western military forces in the field.**

⁷⁴ APM 8

⁷⁵ APM 6

⁷⁶ QQ 168, 169

CHAPTER 4: EUPOL'S ADMINISTRATION

72. In this chapter we consider administrative issues: staffing, resourcing and control.

Understaffing

73. Understaffing is a major issue for EUPOL. The current strength of the mission is 306, well short of its mandated strength of 400 (see paragraph 7 above). We found that the FCO's view on staffing numbers differed from that of other witnesses. The Minister wondered where the target of 400 members had come from and spoke of the need for good quality over numbers: "rather 13 really good people doing the job than 19 just because you have agreed to provide a quota." Karen Pierce also argued that it was more important to focus on excellence, rather than numbers which might risk compromising on quality. "The key thing is to get good people"⁷⁷.
74. However, the view that staff numbers were not important was not widely shared. Ronja Kempin believed that the mission was still significantly understaffed and still unable to expand its activities to the whole territory. The slowness of Member States to provide sufficient personnel was "incomprehensible". If EU Member States wished to exert a greater influence on the reform of the security sector, they would have to boost the mission's staffing and funding considerably. She told us that Francesc Vendrell, when EU Special Representative for Afghanistan (2002–2008), had called for the mission to supply at least two thousand advisers and trainers, but his recommendation had not been taken up. She questioned therefore whether Member States had ever really set out to improve the state of the ANP⁷⁸. Fatima Ayub reported that she had met the head of NTM-A, Lieutenant-General Caldwell, who had expressed concern over EUPOL's ability to play a more serious role because of its capacity and staffing levels⁷⁹.
75. Mr Klompenhouwer said that "since we are operating at 75% of our planned capability, obviously that has implications, we can deliver less". The UK had provided 12 good British police officers as well as justice experts but "more help from the UK would be quite welcome"⁸⁰. He was doing everything possible to lobby Member States to provide the policemen and magistrates needed. The Minister told us that it was not easy to recruit people for the mission⁸¹.
76. Nigel Thomas believed that people "operating at the right level with the right skills" could make a big difference, but thought that understaffing was a concern. He differentiated between police officers, civilian rule of law experts and logistics support staff. Taking into account a reduction of one third for leave requirement, this amounted to a very limited presence of police officers on the ground in some parts of the country⁸².

⁷⁷ QQ 108, 109

⁷⁸ Appendix 3

⁷⁹ Q 29

⁸⁰ 10 contracted staff are also UK nationals.

⁸¹ QQ 109, 152, 172

⁸² Q 68

Accommodation problems

77. Kees Klompenhouwer described the difficulty in finding accommodation for EUPOL personnel, especially in the provinces where EUPOL depended on the PRT lead nations. Occasionally EUPOL had been provided with staff but nowhere to accommodate them. Nigel Thomas also raised accommodation as a problem. National caveats on deployment were further obstacles. Some countries would only deploy officers to certain locations; only three countries (including the UK) would deploy staff in Helmand. He also cited competition with national missions (problems with sparing staff for EUPOL) and budgetary issues (each Member State had a limit to how much it was prepared to deploy). Logistical support was also a problem as civilian rule of law experts could not drive around without military protection. Nevertheless, some progress on accommodation had been made in the course of 2010⁸³.
78. **In terms of civilian policing, the EU has provided a unique and vital capability for the stabilisation of Afghanistan society. We welcome this and applaud the work undertaken by EUPOL staff under very challenging conditions. However, the level of that capability remains a problem.**
79. **The planned size of the EU mission of 400 was always too small to make a major difference to civilian outcomes in Afghanistan. This compares badly to the American and NATO commitment to the broader police training effort and has affected the relationship. We believe that this also has the wider effect of bringing EU Common Security and Defence Policy missions as a whole into disrepute.**
80. **The reputational problem is compounded by the EUs' failure to reach even the limited target of 400 personnel and the mission is severely understaffed. We do not accept the Government's view that the high quality of EUPOL staff obviates the need to reach the target complement. In all such missions EU Member States must meet their commitments in terms of numbers of personnel. The EU should ensure that the mission has a full complement of staff in order to retain credibility. Without this, the EU demonstrates weakness rather than strength.**
81. **The low degree of EU commitment to providing staff, combined with problems of illiteracy, corruption and desertion in the Afghan police and the overall security situation, means that there is a real risk that the EU will fail in an area where it should show leadership. We consider that the original mission should have been undertaken with a much greater level of commitment or not undertaken at all.**
82. **We believe that there is still time to reach the full complement of staff for the remainder of the mission. However, if this cannot be achieved within a reasonable timeframe, the EU should as a last resort revise EUPOL's mandate.**
83. **The UK's current contribution of 14 secondees and 10 contracted staff to the mission compares poorly with other EU Member States, for example Finland with 37 staff. The Government should aim to increase the numbers of personnel the UK provides to EUPOL, focusing on seconded police or rule of law experts, rather than administrative**

⁸³ QQ 68, 172

staff. They should also urge other Member States to make similar efforts to take their share of the burden.

The Brussels-Mission relationship

84. We asked our witnesses about the relationship between Brussels and the Mission on the ground (see Box 3 below). Nigel Thomas criticised the decision-making process in Brussels for its slowness of response which did not fit the “phenomenal” pace of change in Afghanistan. If a decision lay outside the Operational Plan or core strategic objectives, or political issues were involved, the Head had to liaise with Brussels through the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)⁸⁴ and the political forums where it would “get bogged down”. “Some of the impact of the decision-making and the processes adopted in the CPCC really did hamper our ability to operate on the ground”. This had contributed to the decision of the previous Head of Mission to leave. He described the bureaucracy of the system as stifling and urged the EU to provide the Head of Mission with the autonomy needed to respond to the rapidly changing circumstances on the ground⁸⁵. James Kariuki (European Correspondent and Head of Europe Global Group, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) said that the Government believed that EUPOL could fulfil its objectives provided that there was improvement on “the kind of delays in decision-making that we have seen in Brussels in the past”⁸⁶.

BOX 3

EUPOL Command and Control Arrangements

The Political and Security Committee (PSC) exercises political control and strategic direction of the Mission, under the responsibility of the Council of the European Union.

The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), based in Brussels, is the permanent structure responsible for the operational conduct of civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations under the PSC and under the overall authority of the High Representative. The CPCC ensures the effective planning and conduct of civilian CSDP crisis management operations, as well as the proper implementation of all mission-related tasks. It is headed by Kees Klompenhouwer in Brussels as the EU’s Civilian Operation Commander.

The EU Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CivCom) monitors the correct execution of the operation.

The (EUPOL) Head of Mission in Kabul exercises command of the mission on the ground and works closely with the double-hatted EU Special Representative/Head of Delegation, Ambassador Vygaudas Usackas. This double-hatting has been formalised under the Lisbon Treaty and Ambassador Usackas is now a member of the European External Action Service.

85. Kees Klompenhouwer, Head of the CPCC, agreed that the Head of Mission should have leeway in making judgements on the tactical situation on the

⁸⁴ See Box 3

⁸⁵ QQ 68, 104

⁸⁶ Q 110

ground where “he is the master and we will follow his advice.” However, the situation in EU Member States’ capitals had to be taken into account, as well as the situation on the ground. Member State governments, which were making available the resources, had to be convinced that the mandate was being delivered. He commented that the turnover in mission leadership recently had led to Brussels taking a greater role in mission management than before⁸⁷.

86. Cumbersome political consultation processes in Brussels and with Member States has led to problems for the Head of Mission. **We urge the EU to look at whether the Head of Mission could be granted more autonomy to enable him to respond more easily to rapidly changing circumstances on the ground. In addition the EU and Member States should examine whether a speedier system for reaching decisions can be created in Brussels when a need for an urgent political decision arises.**

Budget flexibility and procurement

87. We were told by Ronja Kempin that the start of EUPOL had been delayed by EU bureaucracy. Under EU law, individual Member States could not supply missions with equipment such as vehicles and computers. Supplies and services had to be put out to tender “with the order going to the lowest bidders regardless when they are able to deliver”⁸⁸. Kees Klompenhouwer told us that there had been a “false start” to the launch of the mission due to logistical delays, including in procurement. Subsequently the mission was adequately funded and allowed some flexibility to adapt. Equipment and armoured cars had been provided, as was accommodation in Kabul though not always in the provinces (see paragraph 77 above). He called on the EU to provide the Mission with greater flexibility to move expenditure between budget lines and increase the overall Mission budget to take account of developments such as the provision of additional staff⁸⁹.
88. Nigel Thomas told us that only a small part of the budget was used to fund EUPOL’s projects. Consequently EUPOL had to ask for funds from the Americans to enable them to launch small projects quickly. This stifled the mission’s ability to operate at times but the Americans gave significant help. However, he commented that, from a UK perspective, he had had everything he needed to do his job in Afghanistan⁹⁰.
89. **The UK should raise with other EU Member States whether greater flexibility could be created within the mission’s overall budget, consistent with oversight and accountability to Member States.**
90. **Procurement rules for such operations, and the inability to make use of Member State equipment and assets, must also be revisited.**

⁸⁷ Q 149

⁸⁸ Appendix 3

⁸⁹ QQ 137, 152, 172–3

⁹⁰ Q 69

CHAPTER 5: THE WAY AHEAD

Retrenchment and re-focus

91. Kees Klompenhouwer told us that in the light of the difficulties of deployment in the provinces, principally because of problems with security and the need for protection, Member States agreed to the CPCC's proposal in the spring of 2010 to reduce the Mission's presence from 16 to 13 provinces. "We have to focus on those areas where we can deliver ... We have to be realistic ... the security situation clearly does not allow us to work properly in certain districts where there is active contact with the enemy." Member States were involved in politically sensitive discussions on whether a further reduction might be necessary to concentrate and deliver in a select number of locations⁹¹.
92. Mr Klompenhouwer said that the new focus was to help deliver security in the cities. To this end EUPOL was focusing on 13 cities, implementing a City Police and Justice Programme (CPJP). The aim was to ensure that the police on the ground knew how to investigate a crime, organise checkpoints and deal with incidents. Nigel Thomas elaborated: the CPJP had some 15 training courses giving basic leadership skills, basic patrol officer skills, basic skills in what they should look at and do as police officers and "putting a very basic intelligence model around it". The minimum timescale for implementing the Programme was two years in a smaller location, with Kabul taking four to five years with potentially a further four or five years to build the infrastructure behind the Programme⁹².
93. Kees Klompenhouwer told us that in the spring of 2010 NATO commanders and the EU had decided to develop a police staff college in Kabul to provide a higher cadre of senior Afghan leaders who could steer the "still undisciplined and illiterate police force" forward to consolidate the progress achieved and take it further. If this was not done, the current efforts would not be sustainable and transition to Afghan ownership would not be possible. EUPOL would provide the content and project organisation at the college, with NATO assisting the selection of participants and the logistical support. The EU was asking nations to provide staff and was hopeful that they would respond positively. The Minister also commented on the importance of finding the leaders for the future; it would take time to bring them on⁹³.
94. Current discussions among Member States about withdrawal from some provinces suggest that the Mission is in flux. **We agree that it is sensible to concentrate resources in areas where the Mission is able to operate securely and we applaud the City Police and Justice Programme which seeks to deliver civilian policing in major cities. However, the EU should make efforts to move back into the provinces and expand its coverage when the Mission is up to strength and the security situation permits so as to achieve consistent civilian policing throughout the country.**
95. **The Government should make efforts to recruit UK staff for the new police staff college in Kabul for senior Afghan leaders and encourage other Member States to be equally supportive.**

⁹¹ QQ 146–148

⁹² QQ 73, 74, 141

⁹³ QQ 115, 140, 144, 145

Withdrawal—timetables

96. Faced with the intention by the international community to withdraw military forces in 2014–2015, the EU will need to address the question of the future of EUPOL. Our witnesses agreed that the EU should not give up on Afghanistan, and that commitment and time were needed. Fatima Ayub rejected the “very dangerous mindset,” which was becoming more prevalent, that “that country is just a basket case” where little could be done⁹⁴. The answer to the problems in Afghanistan “is not to turn tail and run ... a better future is possible. There is not something that condemns Afghanistan eternally to war and violence.” The question of what would happen to the police had to be included in the broader question of what would happen in Afghanistan in five year’s time. There was nothing wrong with the strategic vision: “what the EU has articulated that it wants from Afghanistan is what most Afghans want”, but she envisaged a timetable of “maybe 50 years rather than five”⁹⁵.
97. The Minister said that “the country’s future is based on a process of making the country secure”. He also expressed commitment to the task: “no-one can offer any promise or guarantee, but we know that we have to go on doing it. There is not an alternative. We cannot back out and say that it is too difficult.” The Government judged that by 2015 the work of the international combat forces would have ensured that they could be withdrawn because the Afghan army would be able to continue the security efforts. Some form of army training would need to continue and the work of engaging civilians, NGOs and others supporting the future of Afghanistan would also go on. “The Government involvement, whether it is individual bilateral Government relationships or through the European Union and other international groupings, ... with Afghanistan ... will clearly go on post-2015”⁹⁶.
98. The Minister commented that it would take time to eliminate problems, such as corruption, from the Afghan justice system and it “will not be completed in a couple of years. It is an ongoing process”. It would not necessarily resemble UK or US systems, but it had to be consistent with basic principles, accessible to people who should not be afraid of it and who “know that it is fair, free and available to them”⁹⁷.
99. The Minister commented that a peace and reconciliation process had to be part of the future of Afghanistan, requiring a renunciation of violence and an acceptance of the Afghan Government and governance structure. Thereafter it would be for the Afghans themselves to work out their future: there should be an environment conducive to ensuring that the work EUPOL was engaged in, and the process of civilianising the police, was helped by the peace process⁹⁸.
100. Kees Klompenhouwer spoke of the need for “a sustained effort over a long period” to solve the problems in the Afghan police. He agreed that the mission should be looking forward beyond the military timeline to continuing

⁹⁴ Q 22

⁹⁵ QQ 23, 25–26, 46

⁹⁶ QQ 125, 126

⁹⁷ Q 123

⁹⁸ Q 125

the function of EUPOL after NATO forces had withdrawn. The mission's key contribution would take more than the three years currently available under the mandate⁹⁹.

101. Nigel Thomas commented that police training was a long-term development programme; people were wrestling with how EUPOL training would fit in with the military timescales after the military withdrawal. The development of a civilian policing structure was reliant on "a certain level of permissiveness to operate with the country;" if security fell apart, it would not be possible to have a traditional police force. A high-level commitment to EUPOL was needed from outside Afghanistan. For the future EUPOL should maintain its strategic objectives. Within the EU at the top level it was important that this should be "mandated, understood and left to the people on the ground", who were committed and had "a real desire to deliver." The international community was struggling to envisage how the transition process to Afghan ownership should proceed¹⁰⁰.
102. **The EU should consider the level of development in security sector reform at which it should aim. This discussion will need to acknowledge that the Afghan civilian police will not look like a western police force, and corruption is unlikely to be eliminated entirely, but EUPOL must help to deliver a reasonable level of civil order and justice to Afghanistan's long-suffering people.**
103. **The challenges EUPOL faces are considerable. Without a major reduction in, or cessation of, the insurgency, there will not be an environment in which civilian policing can develop, and there is a danger that a vacuum may develop in law and order and security. Even with such conditions—and an expansion of militarily secure areas—EUPOL will not be able to complete its task either in the remaining two and a half years of its extension, or within the timetable set by the international community for the withdrawal of combat forces.**
104. **There is a danger that the deadlines for military withdrawal could expose the mission staff to increased danger and that they will be unable to operate effectively, risking lives of serving police officers for no future effect. The wider security environment will need to be taken into consideration before any further extensions of the mission are decided.**
105. **This has been a troubled mission undertaking a vital task in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Despite achieving local successes, overall there is a strong risk of failure.**

⁹⁹ QQ 140, 142, 161, 167

¹⁰⁰ QQ 63, 74, 92, 101, 104

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter 2: The Operating Environment

Illiteracy, drug-taking and human rights

106. The lack of literacy in the Afghan police is a fundamental problem hindering its development. The EU, the Afghan government and international players should make a major investment in the literacy of police officers and new recruits. This will enable them better to pursue community policing, including criminal investigations and is the most tractable of the issues surveyed here. So far there has been insufficient focus on literacy in the Afghan police and we call on the Government and the EU to increase funding and other support for this crucial area (paragraph 25).
107. We support EUPOL's mandate to mainstream human rights in its work and urge EUPOL to continue to support the Afghan Ministry of the Interior's efforts to eliminate torture from the system and to investigate allegations of abuses (paragraph 27).

Attrition rate

108. EUPOL should urge the Afghan Ministry of the Interior to pay greater attention to the causes of the attrition rate in the police, including high mortality and injury, the lack of leave, welfare or shift patterns, and cultural factors such as deployment far from families and home territory. This should also be built into EUPOL's own strategy (paragraph 31).

Corruption, organised crime, infiltration

109. We urge the EU to redouble its efforts to combat corruption in the police, without which the rule of law will be impossible and the Afghan government's reputation with the people will be further damaged. Establishing a robust financial management system, including an effective chain of payments to ensure that police officers are paid in full and on time, should be a priority, since a well-paid officer is less likely to take a bribe (paragraph 37).

The local auxiliary police

110. The EU should take up with the Afghan Ministry of the Interior and the Americans the potential threat to stability in Afghanistan which will be posed by the newly created auxiliary police if effective command and control are not exercised by the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (paragraph 42).

Women and gender issues

111. EUPOL is right to include as a priority the training of women in its programme to mainstream gender issues and human rights within the Ministry of the Interior and the Afghan National Police, and we welcome the establishment of a training centre for women police officers in Bamiyan (paragraph 45).

Building police links with the judiciary

112. EUPOL should continue to work with the Ministry of the Interior to ensure that those arrested can be properly brought to trial. A greater effort must also be made to tackle corruption in the Ministry of Justice (paragraph 50).

Chapter 3: International Cooperation and the Role of the Police

Different perceptions of policing

113. The EU should work through EUPOL to ensure that police training focuses on the civilian policing role of resolving crimes, maintaining contact with the local population and upholding the rule of law. EU representatives should persuade the Afghan government that it is in their own interests for the police to be allowed to focus on good civilian policing, at least in areas where there is sufficient security for them to operate, since the police are the face of the government in the majority of the country (paragraph 57).
114. Fighting the insurgency should primarily be the responsibility of NATO forces and, increasingly, the Afghan National Army. However, because coordination between the Afghan police and army is a difficult problem, the police are being left to fight the Taliban in some areas and community policing is being neglected. The EU must seek the cooperation of the Afghan Ministry of Defence, NATO and the US to prevent the police being used as a substitute for the Afghan army in the counter-insurgency struggle (paragraph 58).

EUPOL's relations with other actors

115. The lesson to be learnt for the EU and the international community is that, in any future military intervention in failing or failed states, a strategy for early civilian involvement is essential in building effective police and justice systems. If the EU decides that it wants to make a serious contribution to solving civilian and police matters, it should ensure that such missions are at a level that has a significant effect on outcomes (paragraph 61).
116. We understand the problems of integrating with operations run bilaterally by EU Member States before EUPOL was created. However, we believe that EUPOL's impact would be increased if the bilateral operations were to be incorporated into the EU's joint effort. There should be a single adequately resourced European policing mission, rather than a plethora of multi-lateral and bi-lateral missions. The EU should continue to create a more unified European approach to police reform, by integrating the separate Member State bilateral operations into EUPOL where possible (paragraph 62).

Cooperation with NATO on the security of EUPOL personnel

117. Despite this new evidence, we still believe that the lack of a formal cooperation agreement between the NATO forces in Afghanistan and EUPOL on the security of EUPOL personnel has increased the risk to the lives of EUPOL personnel, including British citizens. This is unacceptable. A renewed political effort to secure a formal EU-NATO agreement in Afghanistan must be made. Only the Taliban benefit from the lack of such an agreement. The Government should continue to raise this at the highest level within the EU and NATO. For the same reasons, the Government should also continue to make strong representations to EU and NATO representatives in Afghanistan, about the need to ensure safeguards to personnel on the ground (paragraph 69).

The Afghan government decree on private security contractors

118. We urge the Government and the EU to continue their efforts to obtain a waiver under the decree on banning the use of private security contractors. If

this does not prove possible they should urgently seek alternative security arrangements, in close consultation with NATO and the US, using protection from the western military forces in the field (paragraph 71).

Chapter 4: EUPOL's administration

Understaffing

119. In terms of civilian policing, the EU has provided a unique and vital capability for the stabilisation of Afghanistan society. We welcome this and applaud the work undertaken by EUPOL staff under very challenging conditions. However, the level of that capability remains a problem. (paragraph 78)
120. The planned size of the EU mission of 400 was always too small to make a major difference to civilian outcomes in Afghanistan. This compares badly to the American and NATO commitment to the broader police training effort and has affected the relationship. We believe that this also has the wider effect of bringing the EU Common Security and Defence Policy missions as a whole into disrepute (paragraph 79).
121. The reputational problem is compounded by the EUs' failure to reach even the limited target of 400 personnel and the mission is severely understaffed. We do not accept the Government's view that the high quality of EUPOL staff obviates the need to reach the target complement. In all such missions EU Member States must meet their commitments in terms of numbers of personnel. The EU should ensure that the mission has a full complement of staff in order to retain credibility. Without this, the EU demonstrates weakness rather than strength (paragraph 80).
122. The low degree of EU commitment to providing staff, combined with problems of illiteracy, corruption and desertion in the Afghan police and the overall security situation, means that there is a real risk that the EU will fail in an area where it should show leadership. We consider that the original mission should have been undertaken with a much greater level of commitment or not undertaken at all (paragraph 81).
123. We believe that there is still time to reach the full complement of staff for the remainder of the mission. However, if this cannot be achieved within a reasonable timeframe, the EU should as a last resort revise EUPOL's mandate (paragraph 82).
124. The Government should aim to increase the numbers of personnel the UK provides to EUPOL, focusing on seconded police or rule of law experts, rather than administrative staff. They should also urge other Member States to make similar efforts to take their share of the burden (paragraph 83).

The Brussels-Mission relationship

125. We urge the EU to look at whether the Head of Mission could be granted more autonomy to enable him to respond more easily to rapidly changing circumstances on the ground. In addition the EU and Member States should examine whether a speedier system for reaching decisions can be created in Brussels when a need for an urgent political decision arises. Procurement rules for such operations, and the inability to make use of Member State equipment and assets, must also be revisited (paragraph 84).

Budget flexibility and procurement

126. The UK should raise with other EU Member States whether greater flexibility could be created within the mission's overall budget, consistent with oversight and accountability to Member States (paragraph 89).
127. Procurement rules for such operations, and the inability to make use of Member State equipment and assets, must also be revisited (paragraph 90).

Chapter 5: The Way Ahead*Retrenchment and re-focus*

128. We agree that it is sensible to concentrate resources in areas where the Mission is able to operate securely and we applaud the City Police and Justice Programme which seeks to deliver civilian policing in major cities. However, the EU should make efforts to move back into the provinces and expand its coverage when the Mission is up to strength and the security situation permits so as to achieve consistent civilian policing throughout the country (paragraph 94).
129. The Government should make efforts to recruit UK staff for the new police staff college in Kabul for senior Afghan leaders and encourage other Member States to be equally supportive (paragraph 95).

Withdrawal-timetables

130. The EU should consider the level of development in security sector reform at which it should aim. This discussion will need to acknowledge that the Afghan civilian police will not look like a western police force, and corruption is unlikely to be eliminated entirely, but EUPOL must help to deliver a reasonable level of civil order and justice to Afghanistan's long-suffering people (paragraph 102).
131. The challenges EUPOL faces are considerable. Without a major reduction in, or cessation of, the insurgency, there will not be an environment in which civilian policing can develop, and there is a danger that a vacuum may develop in law and order and security. Even with such conditions—and an expansion of militarily secure areas—EUPOL will not be able to complete its task either in the remaining two and a half years of its extension, or within the timetable set by the international community for the withdrawal of combat forces. (paragraph 103).
132. There is a danger that the deadlines for military withdrawal could expose the mission staff to increased danger and that they will be unable to operate effectively, risking lives of serving police officers for no future effect. The wider security environment will need to be taken into consideration before any further extensions of the mission are decided. (paragraph 104).
133. This has been a troubled mission undertaking a vital task in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Despite achieving local successes, overall there is a strong risk of failure (paragraph 105).

APPENDIX 1: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY (EU SUB-COMMITTEE C)

The Members of the Sub-Committee which conducted this inquiry were:

Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury
 Lord Inge
 Lord Jay of Ewelme
 Lord Jones
 Lord Jopling
 Lord Lamont of Lerwick
 Lord Radice
 Lord Selkirk of Douglas
 Lord Sewel
 Lord Teverson (Chairman)
 Lord Trimble
 Lord Williams of Elvel

Declaration of Interests

Lord Inge

Member Council IISS
Advisor to Aegis

Lord Lamont of Lerwick

Category 1: Directorships

Chairman, Small Companies Dividend Trust
Chairman, Jupiter Adria plc
Director, Balli Group plc (Steel and commodity trading house)
Director, Compagnie Internationale de Participations Bancaires at Financieres (Investment Company) (partly paid through Fintrade)
Director, Jupiter Second Split Trust plc
Director, RAB Capital plc
Director, Phorm Inc (personalisation technologies)
Director, Stanhope Gate Developments

Category 2: Remunerated employment

Adviser, North American Foreclosure and Distressed Opportunities Fund LLP
Consultant, Consensus Business Group (formerly Rotch Property)
Member, Advisory Board, MerchantBridge & Co (investment company)
Member, Advisory Board, Hermitage Global Fund
Member, Advisory Board, Pasco Risk Management Limited

Category 10: Non-financial interests (a)

Chairman, British-Iranian Chamber of Commerce

Category 10: Non-financial interests (c)

Member, Advisory Board, Iran Heritage Foundation

Lord Jay of Ewelme

Chair, Merlin (a charity which runs medical projects in Afghanistan)

Lord Radice

Member of Board, Policy Network

Lord Selkirk of Douglas

Former Home Affairs Minister for Scotland for 7 years between 1987–1997
(a past interest)

A full list of Members' interests can be found in the register of Lords' interests <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld/ldreg.htm>

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF WITNESSES

Oral Evidence

14 October 2010

Ms Fatima Ayub, Open Society Foundation

21 October 2010

Chief Superintendent Nigel Thomas, Former Interim Head of the EU's Afghan Police Mission

28 October 2010

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Written Evidence, APM 1

Written Evidence, APM 2

Written Evidence, APM 3

Written Evidence, APM 4

Written Evidence, APM 5

Written Evidence, APM 6

Written Evidence, APM 7

Written Evidence, APM 8

4 November 2010

Mr Kees Klompenhouwer, Head of EU Civilian Missions

Written Evidence

Dr Ronja Kempin, Head of EU External Relations, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin (Appendix 3)

APPENDIX 3: MEMORANDUM BY DR RONJA KEMPIN, HEAD OF EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS, GERMAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS (SWP), BERLIN

Let me start my written evidence with some words on my background: Since January 2003, I am a researcher at The German Institute for International and Security Affairs of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), where I currently head the Research Division “EU External Relations”. The SWP is an independent scientific establishment that conducts practically oriented research on the basis of which it advises the Bundestag (the German parliament) and the federal government on foreign and security policy issues. The analyses and publications produced by SWP researchers and their participation in national and international debates on key issues help to shape politicians’ opinion in their respective domains. SWP was set up in 1962 by private initiative in Ebenhausen, near Munich, and given the legal status of a foundation. Late in 2000 its headquarters moved to Berlin, which has been SWP’s new home since January 2001. Since January 1965, when the Bundestag unanimously backed the establishment of an independent research centre, the Institute has been federally funded. SWP has eight Research Divisions employing more than 60 scholars. My work on EUPOL Afghanistan started in June 2007, when Germany handed responsibility for transforming the Afghan National Police (ANP) into an effective civil police force to the EU. Since then, I did not only publish on EUPOL Afghanistan, but also advised the German Ministry of the Interior as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on strengthening the impact of the EU police mission in Afghanistan. In 2009, I conducted a major research study entitled: “The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence? A Systematic Assessment of ESDP Missions and Operations”. The project’s main focus were the decision making processes in Brussels and the attendance of the EU’s mission and operations in Brussels as well as in the Member States. Our aim was to identify key weaknesses in the EU’s operational performances that need to be addressed.

I will start my witness by assessing the effectiveness of the EU police mission in Afghanistan.

EUPOL Afghanistan started its work on 15 June 2007. It took over responsibility from Germany, which had already supported the Afghan police once before, back in the 1960s and 1970s. When reconstruction in Afghanistan began in 2002, Berlin again took on this task at the request of the Afghan transitional government and the United Nations. The German Police Project Office (GPPO) made important progress repairing civilian structures that had been almost completely wiped out under the mujahedin and the Taliban. The ANP was reformed organisationally by slimming down the traditional ranks in favour of an effective homogeneous leadership structure and leading posts were filled according to criteria of professionalism. Arrangements were also made to ensure that police were paid regularly. Finally, the German government set up a police academy in Kabul to train middle- and high-ranking officers. From 2002 to 2007 Berlin provided €12 million annually for police-building in Afghanistan. On average there were forty police officers from Germany’s national and state forces working at GPPO in Kabul and its outposts in Mazar-e-Sharif, Kundus, Faizabad and Herat, but the funds and personnel were not enough to achieve the goals that had been set in January 2006: At that time, the international community agreed to set up a “fully constituted, professional, functional and ethnically balanced Afghan National Police and Afghan Border Police with a combined force of up to 62,000”

by the end of 2010. Although Germany succeeded in training about five thousand middle- and high-ranking police officers at the police academy in Kabul and providing short training courses for another fourteen thousand, the German approach would have taken years to reach the goal of training 62,000 police officers. Berlin's resources did not stretch to either train the urgently needed uniformed police on the ground nor to reform the Afghan Ministry of Interior Affairs, which is responsible for the ANP. Therefore, Germany's ruling elite used its EU Council Presidency in the first half of 2007 to put the build-up of the ANP on a broader footing: It proposed to set up an EU police mission, designed to expand and intensify the existing German efforts. The EU was particularly well-suited to be the vehicle for Germany's reform efforts because the Member States had already agreed in November 2005 to provide "funds and expert assistance" in order to "develop a national police and border police force". Thus, in October 2006 the Political and Security Committee (PSC) sent an EU assessment mission to Afghanistan. It recommended "that the EU could consider contributing further to support the police sector through a police mission." At the end of November 2006 the PSC sent a fact-finding mission to Afghanistan. In this context Berlin was quickly able to win the approval of its EU partners for a civilian ESDP mission: On 12 February 2007 the Council of the European Union adopted the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for a police mission in Afghanistan and the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) was approved on 23 April 2007. On 16 May 2007 the Afghan government invited the EU to send a police mission and within two weeks the General Affairs and External Relations Council had adopted the Joint Action establishing a police mission (EUPOL Afghanistan), which began its work on the ground just a fortnight later.

EUPOL Afghanistan was set up to assist "the establishment under Afghan ownership of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements" and thus help stabilise the security situation on the ground. Brussels initially proposed sending 195 police and legal experts under a non-executive mandate. From the CFSP budget €44 million were provided to fund EUPOL Afghanistan until the end of March 2008 and bring the mission to full operational capacity. The deployment was initially set for three years with the mission's size and tasks to be reviewed every six months; in May 2008 the defence ministers decided that the contingent would be expanded to four hundred over the following twelve months in response to the difficult circumstances under which its mission was operating.

Once EUPOL had achieved full operational capacity in Afghanistan it was mandated to fulfil the following four tasks:

- (1) To help the Afghan government draw up a comprehensive police-building strategy, focusing on the development of a national policing plan and a methodical approach for criminal investigations and border management.
- (2) To support the Afghan government in implementing this strategy coherently.
- (3) To connect the simultaneous processes of rebuilding the ANP with the establishment of rule of law structures by conducting training with selected members of the interior and justice ministries and the prosecution service as well as with the police.
- (4) To improve cooperation between the different international actors involved in police-building. In order to achieve this purpose, Germany has handed its leadership of the secretariat of the International Police

Coordination Board (IPCB) to the EU. The IPCB was created in October 2006 at the suggestion of Germany and the United States to strengthen international networking and cooperation in the police sector. The secretariat's job is to coordinate the operational measures (training, mentoring, logistics, reporting) designed to help turn the ANP into an effective civilian institution.

The mandate of EUPOL Afghanistan is thus very strategic and conceptual; in contrast to the German reform efforts, training measures play only a subsidiary role. Whereas the GPPO concerned itself primarily with training high- and middle-ranking police officers, the EU seeks to work out a general strategy for building a functioning national police force. Under the terms of its mandate, the European experts should work in the country's capital, in its five regional police headquarters (Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Kandahar, Gardez, Kabul) and at the level of the thirty-four provinces. Whereas in the past the work of the forty German police and legal advisers was concentrated on Kabul and the northern provinces, EUPOL Afghanistan's mandate provided as well for mission staff to work in the volatile southern and eastern provinces. There they were to assist members of the ANP and the Afghan interior ministry in setting up a police force committed to democratic principles and human rights. While EUPOL Afghanistan operated at the central, regional and provincial levels, the country's approximately four hundred districts, the lowest administrative level, were explicitly excluded from the mandate. As will be shown later on, the decision to focus exclusively on the top administrative levels and thus on the high-ranking police offices will prove to be insufficient.

All in all, one has to state that the EU's police mission in Afghanistan for at least three and a half years had hardly any impact on transforming the ANP into an effective police force. Four reasons hampered the success of the mission:

1. A situation in disarray

When the mission began its work in June 2007 the ANP was—for all the German and American efforts—far from being an effective functioning police force. Many of the country police stations were in a desolate state with widespread shortages of modern firearms, munitions, vehicles, fuel and communication systems. The police were so poorly paid that they were unable to feed their families, making many prone to corruption or entanglement in criminal activities, such as charging arbitrary “taxes” at checkpoints. Moreover, members of the police force have been accused of torture and other human rights violations, while arrangements allowing suspects to buy their way out of custody further undermined the integrity of the force. At the governmental level too, the situation was in disarray. President Karzai's government has the right to appoint police officers and other civil servants in the thirty-four provinces and nearly four hundred districts. All too often the central government legalised militias run by influential warlords by turning them into official local police forces. Those, responsible in Kabul cared little that the militias possessed neither police experience nor training, so that police recruited in this way often acted according to their own “laws”. Last, but not least, the trade in police posts also contributed to delegitimise the Afghan police. Interior ministry officials, most of whom are involved in the drugs trade, misused their power to knowingly sell police stations to tribal leaders and drug barons, who were thus able to ensure that their drug transports could pass unhampered through particular regions. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the Afghan population regarded the ANP as part of the country's security problem rather than as a means to resolving it.

2. Understaffed Mission with no support from the EU member states

The EU has found itself unable to fix these grave problems through the work of EUPOL Afghanistan. But the reasons for the mission's lack of success to date also include home-grown problems within the EU. It is still significantly understaffed, and still unable to expand its activities to the whole territory of the Afghan state. The mission was supposed to grow in three phases. First, an EU planning team was set up to create the mission's structures and prepare the way for its personnel to take up their work smoothly (20 May to 29 June 2007). Then the leading positions were to be filled, the EUPOL offices and staff equipped and 128 police officers from EU Member States and other countries integrated into the mission (30 June to 14 November 2007). Finally, the mission was to be fully operational and present everywhere in the country by the end of March 2008. However, the last two deadlines were missed by a considerable distance. It was months before the participating states began sending personnel to Afghanistan. The size stated in the mandate—195 experts—was not achieved until 26 February 2009, in other words, almost two years after the EU intervention began. Today, the EU police mission comprises 285 experts. This number is as well far below the mission's size which has been enlarged to 400 police advisers and legal experts in May 2008.

The mission is thus a very good illustration of one of the EU's great weaknesses in foreign and security policy: member states plainly find it difficult to keep their promises and place their own personnel at the service of the mission. Only fifteen of the twenty-seven Member States are taking part in EUPOL Afghanistan—and of these only Germany, the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain and Italy have managed to contribute more than ten experts apiece. In order just to reach the named figure of 285 EU staff on the ground, more than fourteen calls for contributions were needed. The slowness of Member States to provide EUPOL Afghanistan with sufficient personnel is especially incomprehensible when one remembers that in April 2009 Paris declared to lead the future NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A)—which also aims to train the ANP—and was immediately willing to send 150 French gendarmes to Afghanistan as part of that mission; forces it never placed at the disposal of the EU police mission.

3. Slowness of EU bureaucracy

EU bureaucracy also considerably delayed the start of EUPOL Afghanistan's work. Under EU law the individual Member States cannot supply missions with equipment such as vehicles and computers. Supplies and services have to be put out to tender, with the order going to the lowest bidders regardless of when they are able to deliver. The grave shortage of qualified personnel leaves EUPOL Afghanistan hardly able to critically support the work of the interior ministry or the regional police chiefs, or to influence the building, training and conduct of the ANP at the critical junctures. It also means that expanding training measures into the provinces (as stipulated by the mandate) is almost impossible. By March 2009 EUPOL was active in half of the thirty-four provinces, with the bulk of its staff stationed in the Kabul area (140 persons) and the rest (about 70) distributed throughout the northern and western provinces. EUPOL's severely limited ability to operate in the country's regions did not make it any easier to support the Afghan government in country-wide implementation of police reforms (again, as required by the mandate). EUPOL staff in the provinces enjoys the protection of the local Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which are part of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Before EUPOL staff comes under the shield of a PRT the EU and the respective lead nation have to conclude a bilateral technical agreement, but in the south and east this was blocked by

Ankara. Although a full member of NATO, Turkey refuses to agree to any deepening of the EU-NATO relationship beyond the Berlin Plus agreement until the Cyprus question is resolved, which means it is impossible to conclude a general agreement between the EU and NATO/ISAF on the protection of EUPOL staff. The American militaries' refusal to protect the members of the EU mission is also an issue here.

4. Reservations in Washington

From the outset Washington was in doubt about the EU police-building initiative. In view of the immense challenge of reconstituting a civilian police force dedicated to democratic principles in a land of the size and ethnic diversity of Afghanistan, US leaders felt that the EU mission was too small. The United States has more than three thousand police trainers in Afghanistan and at the end of March 2009 deployed another four thousand advisers to speed up training of the security forces. Financially too, the EU's commitment is dwarfed by that of the Americans: Whereas in 2010/2011 the twenty-seven EU member states are spending €54.6 million on training the ANP, the United States is investing about €700 million (\$1.1 billion)—more than ten times as much. Disappointed at its European allies' lack of vigour, Washington refuses to this day to extend the protection of the American armed forces to EUPOL staff, and has joined Turkey in obstructing an agreement between the EU and NATO/ISAF. Washington considers the activities of the EU staff in the restive southern provinces to be too peripheral for it to be worth risking its own soldiers for their protection.

Beyond that Washington also refuses to support the EU mission in coordinating the respective training efforts. One of EUPOL's most important goals is to improve the cooperation between international actors in the field of police-building. The instrument for this is the secretariat of the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB, see above), which includes the most important police-building donors and high-ranking representatives of the Afghan interior ministry. Even though the United States has set-up this body by themselves in 2006, this does not prevent Washington from refusing to recognise the body. Unless and until Brussels makes a more substantial contribution in this field, the Americans, who bear well over 90 % of the burden of police-building in Afghanistan, are not going to tolerate Europeans telling them which training measures to conduct and asking to coordinate them. Consequently the Americans send only a single representative to the meetings of the IPCB secretariat and ignore its decisions, which rather undermine its authority. Washington sees this drastic measure as the most effective way to prod its European partners into considerably stepping up their police-building efforts.

Most of the enumerated weaknesses have also been realised in Brussels. When in May 2010 the Member States decided to extend EUPOL Afghanistan's mandate for another three years, they tried to tackle the missions' problems and to adopt new approaches especially with regard to the training of policemen and -women. In this vein, the so called City Police and Justice Program focuses on the build-up of a metropolitan police; the training of the Anti-Crime Police is meant to strengthen the civilian nature of the ANP. However, the mission still faces a number of challenges.

- The first one is certainly the extremely low rate of literate police officers: Less than 30% of all ANP members are able to read and write. This high level of illiteracy not only makes it extremely difficult for the police officers to digest the theoretical contents of their education and training measures. They are also unable to take reports of crimes or to fine for

speeding or parking violation. Without implementation of substantial educational programmes, the international community will never reach its goal of building sustainable policing structures in the country.

- Second, the attrition rates within the ANP are high: 2/3 of the trained police officers quit their service only a few weeks after the end of their formation. Various reasons can be held responsible for this alarming figure: Oftentimes, police officers are not allowed to police their own community but are sent to culturally different regions. Also, the ANP faces extremely high casualties and thus prevents potential officers from joining the force. In 2009, an estimated number of 639 police officers lost their lives in action (compared to 292 members of the Afghan National Army). Third, even though the monthly wages of the ANP officers has been raised to 200\$ in 2010, a trained police officer can still earn at least 300\$ working for a Taleban or a mujahedin commander.
- Corruption is still endemic in Afghanistan. EUPOL Afghanistan was heavily involved in developing an anti-corruption strategy. The mission is very active in identifying people—from the top to the bottom of the ANP and the Ministry of the Interior—who are corrupt. However, putting these individuals through a legal process is quasi-impossible, as the judicial system of the country is still in its infancy. Also, as I already mentioned in the beginning, the government of President Karzai still uses its right to appoint police officers and other civil servants in the thirty-four provinces and nearly four hundred districts to either legalise militias run by influential warlords or to strengthen the political influence of members of his family that are known for their involvement in drug-trafficking.

These challenges have to be addressed not only by EUPOL Afghanistan, but by all international actors involved in the reconstruction of the country. The EU nevertheless has to substantially increase its training capabilities in Afghanistan—otherwise Afghanistan will not possess a civilian policing element when the international community withdraws its military forces. When the text of EUPOL Afghanistan's mandate was being drafted, there was already criticism of the mission's meagre personnel resources. Francesc Vendrell, then EU Special Representative for Afghanistan (EUSR), called for the mission to supply at least two thousand advisers and trainers. In view of the desolate condition of the Afghan police and the widespread corruption in and around the police service, he said, the upper limit of two hundred would have to increase tenfold if noticeable headway shall be made. But his recommendation fell on deaf ears in Brussels, which raises the question whether the EU Member States actually ever really set out to improve the state of the ANP. The hesitancy of the chosen EU approach is also reflected in the way the mission was designed: from the beginning it was only targeting on changing the structural framework of policing while remaining blind to the country's almost total lack of functioning uniformed police on the ground. When EUPOL Afghanistan failed to make satisfactory progress and there was no debate about the mission's course, certain important EU Member States, for example the UK and the Netherlands, turned their backs increasingly openly. Since the end of 2008 they have been pulling their police advisers and legal experts out of EUPOL and working with the Americans instead. In the course of 2007 the Pentagon's central command for Afghanistan (Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, CSTC-A) developed what is so far the most comprehensive programme for training and building the ANP: Focused District Development (FDD). Set up to cover the previously neglected district level, it provides two months training in regional centres for every police unit in each of the almost four

hundred districts. While a unit is in training, the police work in its district will be conducted by the newly created and especially well trained Afghan National Civilian Order Police (ANCOP). After training has been completed the police units will return to their home districts, where they will be supported by a Police Mentoring Team (generally composed of civil police trainers, military police and interpreters) which provides ongoing training and advises the police units in their daily work. The complete cycle of the FDD programme amounts to about ten months, comprising assessment of the district, the actual training and post-training support. An initial evaluation found the programme to produce solid and lasting results. The UK and the Netherlands are now participating exclusively in the American FDD programme. Since January 2009 Germany has also been training police at district level under the FDD scheme and intends to model its national police projects—currently running under the auspices of EUPOL Afghanistan—ever more strongly on that example.

There is no doubt: FDD has its merits! The US government has realised that ordinary police officers are desperately needed. This is why prominent EU states joined them in their effort to train these forces. But the FDD-curriculum, exclusively designed by CSTC-A, does not train civilian police officers but paramilitary forces that can be aligned to counter-insurgency operations. I do not criticise this programme—in large parts of the country, policemen are involved in heavy combat and thus need the provided survival skills. However, it cannot be in Europe's interest that the large majority of Afghan police officers are trained and mentored by military officers that do not themselves possess of a policing background.

As a sort of conclusion, let me state the following: In June 2007 the Member States of the EU declared themselves willing to join together to build the Afghan police force. The civil EUPOL Afghanistan mission pursued ambitious goals: it was supposed to develop a national policing plan and thus generate viable police structures. And it was supposed to coordinate international efforts to create an Afghan police force dedicated to the principles of democracy and rule of law. Those goals are still far off. The civilian intervention of EUPOL Afghanistan is increasingly turning out to be a litmus test of the EU's credibility in the field of security. To this day the EU Member States have failed to deploy the full contingent, nor were they able to keep their promise to have a presence across the whole country. Their activities are still concentrated primarily on the capital Kabul and the northern provinces. But above all, the EU has failed to earn the support of the Americans. Without active American cooperation the Europeans have no chance of developing a comprehensive training strategy encompassing border police, uniformed patrols and criminal investigators. And without the protection of the US forces the mission is unable to work at all in the volatile south. The EU will not receive their support until it tangibly enhances the impact of EUPOL Afghanistan. If the Member States of the EU wish to exert a greater influence on the reform of the security sector in Afghanistan, they will have to considerably boost the ESDP mission's staff and funding. EUPOL Afghanistan is still significantly below its upper limit of four hundred staff and the European financial contribution is but a fraction of the American. These defects need to be remedied swiftly. EUPOL Afghanistan must also be put in a position to better train police forces at district level. The success of FDD demonstrates just how urgently Afghanistan needs capable police in the districts as well. But those in the EU Council Secretariat and the PSC, responsible for the political control and strategic direction of EUPOL Afghanistan, should also spend some time and energy in identifying gaps left open by the Americans and give the mission the job of filling them. In that way it could meaningfully complement the American efforts, all by strengthening the civilian character of the ANP.

APPENDIX 4: GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADJU	Afghan Drugs and Justice Unit
ANCOP	Afghan National Civil Order Police
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
CivCom	EU Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CPJP	City Police and Justice Programme
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
DfID	Department for International Development
EU	European Union
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FDD	Focussed District Development Programme
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GPPO	German Police Project Office
GPPT	German Police Project Team
GTZ	German Office for Technical Cooperation
HPTC	Helmand Police Training Centre
IPCB	International Police Coordination Board
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
LOFTA	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
MFA	Afghanistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MICC	Ministry of Interior Coordination Cell
MoI	Ministry of the Interior
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission Afghanistan
PRTs	Provincial Reconstruction Teams
PSCs	Private Security Contractors
PSC	Political and Security Committee
SOMA	Status of Mission Agreement (of EUPOL in Afghanistan)

SWP	Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin)
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US	United States

EUPOL Afghanistan

