In 24 hours, a strategic clarification on 4 fundamental points. The end of an inconsistency
(B2) Until now, faced with the crisis in Syria and in the rest of the world, the French and the Europeans had no real strategy. Or rather they had several, often contradictory. They annihilated each other and thus prevented any consequent action (read: Refugees, Russia, Bashar? Europe will really have to choose!). After the attacks in Paris, François Hollande's speech to Congress on Monday (November 16) and the discussion between defense ministers on Tuesday (November 17), clarifications were made, in a notable way, on four fundamental points.
First clarification: in Syria, the enemy is indeed Daesh (aka the Islamic State organization ISIL or ISIS depending on the denominations). Bashar's question therefore becomes secondary. François Hollande confirmed this in his speech to the congress (read: Terrorism. François Hollande rings the bells to Europeans and calls for more solidarity). Paris has clarified its objectives which, as a result, make it possible to clarify the European strategy. France being one of the last countries to proclaim, urbi et orbi, its ambition to see Bashar leave the government.
Second clarification: Russia is no longer an adversary. Moscow has not become a friend. But he is an ally. The desire for a coalition unique ranging from Russia to the United States, encompassing Turkey and Iran, could be discussed by some allies. She is however ipso facto Coming into force. The Russians symbolically striking, following the French, Raqqa, the stronghold of Daesh in Syria. With Washington's consent. This is also why France has chosen to invoke Article 42.7 of the European Treaty and not Article 5 of the Atlantic Alliance, to allow a maximum of allies to be incorporated into the battle. This clarification closes the door of almost two years of tension, almost to the day after the signing of the association agreements with Ukraine which had provoked the ire of Moscow. Admittedly, the situation remains the same in Crimea and the Ukrainian question is still not settled. The true test of this new doctrine will be in December, when the economic and political sanctions against Russia are revised.
Third clarification: we will have to spend more on security and defense. Until now, there were two contradictory objectives defined at European and Euro-Atlantic level. We must spend more on defense said the 28 of NATO gathered in Newport in Wales, a year ago, to reach 2% of GDP (only a few countries including Greece are at this level). It is necessary to save at all levels of the State to enter the criteria of the Stability Pact said the 28 (of the EU) and the European Commission. Today, this dilemma is resolved. And the sentence of François Hollande, the security pact prevails over the stability pact becomes in fact the unwritten rule. But it will still be necessary to define the nature of this exception, its duration, and its intensity. The invocation of Article 42.7 provides an “objective” reason, of a legal nature, to the European Commission, allowing it to grant France what it may refuse to other countries tomorrow. The question that now officially arises is whether certain defense expenditures should not be exempted more generally from the stability pact. Much more complex.
Fourth clarification: military solidarity has a double trigger. Until now, no one would question the primacy of NATO in providing defense against a common enemy, preferably state or semi-state. NATO had a concept of “All together”, in a “cold war” version. All together against Russia. All together in Afghanistan... The semi-failure of the operation in Afghanistan (1) has set the record straight. Today, the doctrine becomes more realistic, it is each " according to his means » and his defense posture (neutral / not neutral, ...). And the solidarity effort is ensured according to a coordination of means made by the European Union, and not in a European mission. NATO is left aside (2), relegated (for the moment) to the function of territorial defense of European territory, in the strict sense.
(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)
(1) Triggered by the United States under Article V, after the attacks of 2001
(2) We can notice that the Americans who lead the international coalition in Iraq have never asked for the involvement of NATO (to better involve the Arab countries). What should worry at bd Leopold III, the headquarters of NATO.
